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Abstract
The 1648 Peace of Westphalia created an understanding of state sovereignty free from
external interference that remained largely unaltered until the last century. The horrors of
the Holocaust and the significant humanitarian crises of the 20th century have presented
the international community with a new type of threat to international peace and security
and have sparked an ongoing conversation about the limitations of traditional
sovereignty. Russia has positioned itself as a firm supporter of a strict adherence to the
Westphalian concept of sovereignty, but my thesis argues that Russians do not value this
interpretation as much as they claim to, and that in fact Moscow recognizes that this
definition is a thing of the past. I examine Russian actions surrounding the 2011 UNsanctioned intervention in Libya and the ongoing conflict in Syria, particularly focusing
on the major differences between Russian decision-making in the two cases. I analyze
transcripts of Security Council meetings in order to demonstrate that there is far more to
Russian actions in Syria than Moscow’s public position suggests, and I subsequently
offer a number of alternative explanations for Russian decision-making surrounding
Syria. These alternative explanations demonstrate that even the Russians, who have
portrayed themselves as the great defenders of traditional state sovereignty, recognize the
modern limitations to strict Westphalian sovereignty and understand that this traditional
definition is a thing of the past. This conclusion is significant because in demonstrating
that traditional sovereignty’s greatest champion acknowledges the modern shift in the
concept, I prove that the departure from strict Westphalian sovereignty is not merely a
theory, but a reality.
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I. Introduction

The Oxford English Dictionary defines “sovereignty” as “a territory under the
rule of a sovereign, or existing as an independent state.” 1 This definition, which implies
autonomy within a given territory, can be traced back to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.
The treaties known as the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War, a war
between a number of powerful European states that divided Protestant powers and
Roman Catholic states. While the treaties included a number of provisions specific to
various regions and territories across Europe, the overall effect was political order on the
continent. The European powers that signed the treaties in 1648 agreed to not interfere in
each other’s internal affairs, and while not all parties immediately respected this
agreement, it set a standard for the concept of nation-state sovereignty. 2 “Westphalian
sovereignty” refers to the notion of the sole authority of a nation-state within its territory,
and an important element of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty is the illegitimacy of
any sort of outside interference in a nation-state’s internal affairs. 3 While history
indicates that such interference continued after 1648, the Westphalian system
significantly altered the conception of nation-state sovereignty. 4
The definition of sovereignty agreed upon in 1648 remained largely unaltered
until the mid-20th century when, still reeling from the horrors of the Holocaust, the

1

Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2013., s.v. “sovereignty, n.”
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/185343?redirectedFrom=sovereignty>.
2
Dan Philpott, “Sovereignty,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2010.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/sovereignty>.
3
Derek Croxton, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,” The International
History Review 3 (1999): 575, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40109077>.
4
Philpott, “Sovereignty.”
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majority of states signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. While not
legally binding and therefore not technically affecting state sovereignty, the declaration
represented a “tethering” 5 of states to obligations regarding human rights that would
theoretically affect domestic practices to a degree. 6 Other related international treaties,
such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
soon followed, and nation-states continued to agree to alter their internal practices in
order to conform to international standards.
When the Charter of the United Nations was drafted and adopted in 1945,
Member States of the newly-formed international organization were primarily concerned
with preventing a third world war through international cooperation. After the failure of
the League of Nations and the outbreak of World War II the international community
recognized that economies, infrastructure, populations, and institutions of individual
states simply could not survive another massive interstate war.
Since the formation of the United Nations in 1945, there has been a global
decrease in interstate wars, but a marked increase in intrastate conflicts, especially since
the end of the Cold War. 7 Such conflicts, often rooted in ethnic or political disputes and
characterized by widespread violence and human rights violations, 8 have presented the
international community with an entirely new type of threat to international peace and
security.

5

Philpott, “Sovereignty.”
Philpott, “Sovereignty.”
7
Suay Nilhan Ackalin, “Intra-state Conflicts as Security Threats in a Globalized World,” Humanity &
Social Sciences Journal 6, no. 1 (2011): 23, < http://www.idosi.org/hssj/hssj6(1)11/4.pdf>.
8
Ackalin, “Intra-state Conflicts as Security Threats,” 24.
6
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At the end of the 20th century, the United Nations began to endorse interventional
measures that entailed the use of external military forces to influence the internal actions
and events of specific nation-states. These measures have “involved the approval of
military operations to remedy an injustice within the boundaries of a state or the outside
administration of domestic matters like police operations.” 9 While UN peacekeeping
operations occurred throughout the 20th century, the operations during the Cold War were
generally only authorized after the invitation or consent of the state’s government. 10 The
interventions of the 1990’s, however, often occurred without such invitation or consent,
obviously violating the Westphalian concept of sovereignty.
The final decade of the 20th century presented the world with multiple instances of
humanitarian crisis, the vast majority of which remain in the not-so-distant memories of
human rights activists. Estimates of the civilian death toll of the 1994 Rwandan genocide
alone top 800,000 dead over the course of only three months. 11 The Rwandan genocide
along with the war and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the ethnic conflict and war in Kosovo,
and the Somali Civil War all represent armed conflict of international concern, but the
world’s reactions to these events varied immensely. After the massive bloodshed of the
1990’s, it was clear that the international community had failed to protect innocent
civilians around the globe.

9

Philpott, “Sovereignty.”
Philpott, “Sovereignty.”
11
United Human Rights Council, “Genocide in Rwanda,” unitedhumanrights.org, 2013,
<http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm>.
10
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The rise of humanitarian interventionism since the early 1990’s has led to an
international conversation about sovereignty. 12 One of the most important developments
in this conversation has been the advent of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine,
originally proposed in 2001. R2P refers to a state’s responsibility to protect its own
citizens, but also suggests a responsibility on the part of the international community to
protect citizens if their own state fails to do so. R2P was drafted as the result of UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s urging and was conceived in response to the high
number of mass atrocity incidents of the 1990’s.
In a 1998 lecture, Annan made an important distinction between what he deemed
two different sovereignties. He explained, “The UN Charter was issued in the name of
‘the peoples,’ not the governments of the United Nations… The Charter protects the
sovereignty of peoples. It was never meant as a license for governments to trample on
human rights and human dignity. Sovereignty implies responsibility, not just power.” 13
The concept of sovereignty has long been at the center of debates about the scope of the
United Nations’ power, and the UN Charter seems to endorse the common notion of
sovereignty that can be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The treaty’s
definition of sovereignty stipulated that countries could not interfere in the internal affairs
of another country without an expressed invitation to do so, 14 and the UN Charter
contains similar language.

12

James A. Caporaso, “Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty,”
International Studies Review 2, no. 2 (2000): 3. < http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/15219488.00203/abstract>.
13
Alynna J. Lyon, “Global Good Samaritans: When Do We Heed ‘the Responsibility to Protect’?” Irish
Studies in International Affairs 20 (2009): 44. < http://www.jstor.org/stable/25735149>.
14
Lyon, “Global Good Samaritans,” 42.

4

On the other hand, the UN Charter also contains articles suggesting an obligation
to protect individuals, regardless of state sovereignty. Article 55 of the Charter states that
the UN is to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms,” 15 while Article 56 contains language obligating all UN memberstates to take “joint and separate action” 16 to ensure that the spirit of Article 55 is
preserved. These elements of the UN Charter contradict the Westphalian notion of
sovereignty, and Annan’s articulation of a dual definition of sovereignty demonstrates an
attempt to shift the concept of sovereignty as it relates to the international system.
Annan’s “two sovereignties” reflect sovereignty as a responsibility rather than an
inalienable right, and this responsibility includes a nation’s obligations to protect its own
citizens. In conjunction with the Canadian Government, Kofi Annan established the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 with the goal of
working to popularize the idea of a global “responsibility to protect” individuals and
populations. Annan came out publicly in strong favor of the “ability to bypass state
sovereignty in cases where human rights violations mandated the intervention of the
international community,” 17 and the ICISS’ initial report allowed for such intervention as
a last resort. The Commission’s findings were revised at the 2005 World Summit, after
which the edited version of R2P was unanimously approved by the General Assembly.
R2P is intended to normalize the new concept of sovereignty proposed by Annan,
suggesting that if a nation fails to protect its own people, it concedes its right to
sovereignty to the international community until it is deemed capable of fulfilling its
15

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, Article LV.
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml>.
16
Ibid., Article LVI.
17
Lyon, “Global Good Samaritans,” 44.
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responsibility to its people. R2P is a complicated doctrine that has been met with
significant criticism, but it has seemed to gain traction in the near decade since its official
adoption in 2005. Governments around the world have begun using language associated
with R2P, and the Obama Administration has notably directly acknowledged the idea of
sovereignty as responsibility. 18
In full practice, R2P entails a significant change in the concept of sovereignty – it
suggests that sovereignty is essentially conditional, rather than absolute. 19 This new
sovereignty emphasizes responsibility rather than control, 20 and many of R2P’s critics
take issue with this shift. While certainly not the doctrine’s only critic, Russia has come
out as a steadfast supporter of a strict, traditional interpretation of sovereignty, and its
position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council gives the
country’s leadership a mechanism with which it can ensure its concerns are heard. Russia
is perhaps the most vocal critic of R2P in the Security Council, constantly expressing
opposition to any proposed action that it believes will violate a state’s sovereignty. When
Russian diplomats discuss sovereignty, they speak in terms that directly reflect the
traditional Westphalian definition – they generally reference states’ authority over their
own domestic territories and emphasize that the international community cannot interfere
with this authority.
My thesis argues that the Russians do not value this strict Westphalian
interpretation of sovereignty as much as they claim to, and that in fact Moscow
18

Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,”
whitehouse.gov, April 23, 2012, < http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-andvideo/video/2012/04/23/president-obama-speaks-preventing-mass-atrocities#transcript>.
19
Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun. “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (2002):
101. < http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=7568988&site=ehostlive&scope=site>.
20
Ibid.
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recognizes that this interpretation is a thing of the past. I reach this conclusion by
examining Russian actions surrounding the 2011 conflict in Libya and the ongoing civil
war in Syria, particularly focusing on Russia’s motivations in blocking Security Council
action in Syria after allowing it in Libya. After a background of the evolution of
sovereignty and the development of the Responsibility to Protect, the third and fourth
chapters examine the cases of the Libyan intervention and the Syrian Civil War,
respectively. My next chapter addresses Russian decision-making regarding Syria and is
divided into two major sections. The first section analyzes transcripts of Security Council
meetings in order to demonstrate that there is far more to Russian actions in Syria than
Moscow’s public position suggests. The second section offers a number of alternative
explanations for Russian decision-making surrounding Syria which prove that even the
Russians, who have portrayed themselves as the great defenders of traditional state
sovereignty, recognize the modern limitations to strict Westphalian sovereignty and
understand that this traditional definition is a thing of the past. This conclusion is
significant because in demonstrating that traditional sovereignty’s greatest champion
acknowledges the modern shift in the concept, I prove that the departure from strict
Westphalian sovereignty is not merely a theory, but a reality.

7

II. Background

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia established a commonly-accepted definition of
sovereignty that survived for several centuries. While states have clearly not always
respected this definition, it has remained a core basis for the international system and has
played a significant role in defining nation-states. The Westphalian concept of
sovereignty is marked by the “state’s capacity to make authoritative decisions regarding
the people and resources within its territory.” 21 This principle goes hand-in-hand with the
linked principle of non-intervention, or the notion that states will not interfere with the
domestic affairs of other states. 22
An interesting conundrum of traditional sovereignty is the source of legitimate
sovereignty – a state’s sovereignty is derived from the “domestic political legitimacy of a
state,” 23 implying that a state’s sovereignty is defined by domestic elements. If
sovereignty is defined by internal elements, and the international community is obligated
to respect a state’s sovereignty and refrain from intervening in its domestic affairs, the
traditional system of sovereignty essentially grants freedom from external intervention to
states (or governments) that consider themselves legitimate. The lack of an “external
authority to judge the internal legitimacy of sovereignty states” 24 means that states have
generally exercised complete domestic authority so long as they have respected other

21

Evans and Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” 102.
Zachary D.A. Hingst, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Building Block or Roadblock?”
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 22, no. 227 (Spring 2013): 239. <
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/tlcp22&collection=journals&page=227#233>.
23
Ibid., 238.
24
Ibid., 239.
22

8

states’ rights to do the same. In a way, this conundrum has been the basis for the shifting
interpretation of sovereignty over the last century.
The formation of the United Nations in 1945 and the world’s subsequent trend
toward globalization have served as catalysts in the evolution of the concept of
sovereignty. This background chapter will address the legal framework for UNsanctioned interventions, a brief history of humanitarian interventionism in the 20th
century, and the development of the Responsibility to Protect, which represents perhaps
the most concrete evidence for the shift in the international community’s definition of
sovereignty.
Legal Framework for Interventions
The United Nations was founded shortly after the end of World War II and the
Charter of the United Nations contains a great deal of language pertaining to interstate
conflicts. 25 After the two wars of the early 20th century, global powers sought to institute
an international framework to prevent a third world war. To this end, Chapter I of the
Charter says, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” 26 The
same chapter continues on to say that “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state… but this principle shall not prejudice the application
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” 27 Chapter VII, entitled “Action with

25

Andrew Garwood-Gowers, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the Exception,
Syria as the Norm?” University of New South Wales Law Journal 36, no. 2 (2013): 596 <
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/swales36&collection=journals&page=594#605>.
26
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Article II.
27
Ibid.
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Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” allows
the UN Security Council to take action in situations that fit the criteria mentioned in the
chapter title. Article 42 of Chapter VII says, “Should the Security Council consider that
measures provided for in Article 41 [‘measures not involving the use of armed force’ 28]
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security.” 29 While the Charter was written at a time when intrastate conflicts were not of
primary concern to the international community, Chapter VII has become instrumental in
UN action on such crises.
If the Security Council determines a conflict, interstate or intrastate, is a threat to
international peace and security, it can legally approve a host of measures, including
intervention by UN Member States. 30 While Chapter VII has been invoked many times in
resolutions that take non-military action, military interventions under Chapter VII have
been less frequent. 31 Such resolutions have dealt with a range of issues, but humanitarian
strife has emerged as a dominant factor in the Security Council’s use of Chapter VII to
sanction interventions. 32
Humanitarian Interventionism in the 20th Century
A number of humanitarian crises in the 1990’s played a significant part in the role
of the international community in intrastate conflicts with significant components of

28

Ibid., Article XLI.
Ibid., Article XLII.
30
Garwood-Gowers, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring,” 596.
31
Patrik Johansson, “The Humdrum Use of Ultimate Authority: Defining and Anaylsing Chapter VII
Resolutions,” Nordic Journal of International Law 78 (2009): 339. <
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=44016993&site=ehostlive&scope=site>.
32
Johansson, “The Humdrum Use of Ultimate Authority,” 332.
29
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humanitarian crisis. The decade is marked by a number of failures interspersed with a
few semi-successes on the part of the international community. In 1991, UN Security
Council Resolution 688 condemned the Iraqi Government’s repression of civilians,
especially Kurds, and demanded that “Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to
international peace and security in the region, immediately end the repression.” 33 While
the resolution made no mention of a no-fly zone, the United States, Great Britain, France,
and a number of other nations instituted two no-fly zones over Iraq in conjunction with a
multilateral humanitarian relief effort on the ground. 34 The legality of the no-fly zones
came into question after the operation’s conclusion, but there were no significant
repercussions for the coalition that enforced the zones. 35 Even though Resolution 688
was not a robust Security Council authorization of external action and the aforementioned
countries’ no-fly zones were not sanctioned by the Security Council, the humanitarian
relief efforts that occurred throughout Iraq pursuant to the resolution were significant
because they involved external action within Iraq’s borders without the permission of the
Iraqi Government. 36
A year later, Resolution 794 invited Member States to create an operation,
eventually called the Unified Task Force, to facilitate the providing of humanitarian
assistance to civilians in Somalia. 37 There was no “centralized authority structure” 38 in
Somalia at the time, so the operation again occurred at the sole discretion of the
international community rather than the sovereign government. The task of providing
33

Security Council Resolution 688 (1991).
Lyon, “Global Good Samaritans,” 42.
35
Ibid., 42.
36
Ibid., 43.
37
Security Council Resolution 794 (1992).
38
Lyon, “Global Good Samaritans,” 43.
34
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humanitarian assistance quickly expanded, eventually including military force on the
ground. 39 While both of these operations were generally considered successful, they were
quickly followed by a number of failures in situations of mass humanitarian strife.
The Rwandan genocide ultimately resulted in over 800,000 deaths and mass
displacement within the country, 40 and while the “United Nations had extensive
documentation of human-rights violations in [Rwanda] and was aware of the volatile
nature of the conflict,” 41 the United Nations’ response has been considered one of the
great failures of the international community in recent history. After the mass killings
began in early April 1994, the Security Council reduced the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda from 2,500 peacekeepers to a mere 270 on April 21st. 42 This move
came after several Security Council members expressed strong opposition to UN
involvement in Rwanda, including US President Bill Clinton. While both the United
Nations and world leaders have expressed regret regarding the UN’s failure to intervene
in Rwanda, 43 the events of 1994 showed the limits of the Security Council’s commitment
to intervening in humanitarian crises.
In 1995, UN peacekeepers deployed to Srebrenica amidst the Bosnian war failed
to prevent the massacre of 7,000 Muslims by Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces. 44 While
UN forces had been present since the conflict began in 1993, the Srebrenica Massacre
represented the shortcomings of the peacekeeping force and resulted in extensive
39

Ibid.
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Amnesty Internationa, “The World Still Failing to Act Despite Rwanda Genocide Shame,” amnesty.org,
April 7, 2014, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/world-still-failing-act-despite-rwanda-genocide-shame2014-04-07>.
43
British Broadcasting Company, “UN Admits Rwanda Genocide Failure,” BBC News, April 15, 2000,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/714025.stm>.
44
Lyon, “Global Good Samaritans,” 43.
40
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criticism of the Security Council for not immediately sending reinforcements to the city
as the Serbs began to close in on the city. 45
Perhaps the most interesting case of humanitarian intervention in the 1990’s for
the purposes of understanding the shift in role of humanitarian strife in the international
community is that of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In an attempt to end a
violent ethnic conflict between Serbian forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and Kosovo Albanian rebels, 35 NATO countries staged a military campaign against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in March 1999. 46 This intervention was not authorized
by the United Nations and was certainly not invited by the government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. 47 Using language that seems ironic given his sharp opposition to
involvement in Rwanda, US President Bill Clinton “asserted that the United States had a
‘moral imperative’ to protect the people of Kosovo from the ethnic cleansing campaign
and the wrath of Slobodan Milosevic’s nationalistic regime.” 48
One of the most important implications of the very different international
responses in the aforementioned cases is that there were no standard operating procedures
for responding to intrastate conflicts with significant humanitarian consequences. 49 The
UN responses (or lack thereof) to the humanitarian crises of the 1990’s were “widely
perceived as too little too late, misconceived, poorly resourced, poorly executed, or all of
the above.” 50 The events of the 1990’s set the stage for the advent of the Responsibility to

45

Ibid.
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Evans and Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” 99.
50
Ibid., 100.
46
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Protect and the related general shift in the international community’s understanding of
sovereignty.
The Responsibility to Protect
After assuming office in 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan “campaigned
for… the ability to bypass state sovereignty in cases where human rights violations
mandated the intervention of the international community.” 51 In 2000, Annan established
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and tasked it
with “trying to develop ...a global political consensus on the question of humanitarian
intervention.” 52 The ICISS, formed by the Canadian Government and made up by UN
General Assembly members, issued a subsequent report in December 2001 in which it
outlined its new Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.
The Responsibility to Protect relies on a new interpretation of sovereignty that
derives state sovereignty from a state’s ability to “protect and guarantee” 53 human rights
within its territory. This interpretation suggests that if a state fails to protect its people
from harm or violates its citizens’ human rights, it has “relinquished its sovereign
legitimacy” 54 and the international community, through the United Nations Security
Council, is obligated to step in to protect those citizens. This essentially repaints
sovereignty as a social contract between a state and its people, 55 and aims to resolve the
conundrum of self-determined sovereignty outlined earlier in this chapter. 56

51

Lyon, “Global Good Samaritans,” 44.
David Chandler, “Unravelling the Paradox of The Responsibility to Protect,” Irish Studies in
International Affairs 20 (2009): 28. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25735148>.
53
Hingst, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” 238.
54
Ibid., 240.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid., 256.
52
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R2P is a set of three responsibilities on the part of the international community:
the responsibility to prevent humanitarian crises, the responsibility to react in the event of
a crisis, and the responsibility to rebuild after intervening. 57 The ICISS Report places
significant emphasis on military intervention as a last resort, 58 but it has nonetheless
become a focal point of the discussion of R2P.
According to the ICISS Report, there are six principles that must be met in order
to justify military intervention: just cause, right intention (including a requirement of
multilateralism), intervention as a last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects,
and right authority. 59 While the ICISS Report did not create an absolute set of criteria for
humanitarian intervention, it included a set of conditions that would necessitate
international involvement:
Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which
is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act,
or a failed state situation; or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing,’ actual or apprehended,
whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror, or rape. 60
The Report designates the Security Council as the primary legitimate source for
authorizing interventions in such cases, but it also mentions both the UN General
Assembly and regional organizations as viable alternatives. 61
In 2005, representatives of every UN Member State convened at the World
Summit in New York City. After significant deliberation, the Summit unanimously
adopted the Responsibility to Protect, but in a much different form than the doctrine

57

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility to
Protect,” (Ottawa, 2001): v. <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>.
58
Hingst, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” 255.
59
Evans & Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” 103.
60
ICISS, “The Responsibility to Protect,” 32.
61
Garwood-Gowers, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring,” 597.
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outlined in the 2001 ICISS Report. The document that came out of the World Summit did
not include the six criteria for intervention outlined above, and limited the application of
the R2P principle to the four categories of mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing) as opposed to human rights violations. 62
The new R2P document also eliminated the ICISS Report’s mention of the General
Assembly and regional organizations as alternative sources of legitimate multilateral
intervention. 63 The language of the 2005 outcome document also reflected the
international community’s unwillingness to oblige itself to intervention, consistently
repeating the phrase, “we are prepared to take collective action… on a case-by-case
basis” 64 which ensures that the Security Council’s hands will never be tied in determining
whether to intervene in an intrastate conflict. 65 In 2006, the UN Security Council
unanimously passed Resolution 1674 reaffirming Security Council’s commitment to the
2005 adoption of the Responsibility to Protect. 66
R2P has not yet become an international norm or even an “accepted custom.” 67
There are no set criteria for how many states must adopt a practice as a custom before it
can find a place in the international legal framework, 68 but it does not seem as though this
will occur for R2P anytime soon. The Responsibility to Protect is “not part of any
international treaty, has not attained the status of customary international law, and is not

62

Chandler, “Unravelling the Paradox,” 31.
Garwood-Gowers, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring,” 598.
64
United Nations General Assembly, “2005 World Summit Outcome Document,” (New York, 2005): 30. <
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement>.
65
Garwood-Gowers, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring,” 600.
66
Ibid., 599.
67
Hingst, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” 249.
68
Ibid., 241.
63
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recognized as a general principle of law.” 69 Its significance, however, lies in the
unanimous acknowledgement by all UN Member States in 2005 that the United Nations
has a role to play in intrastate crises. 70 While the document adopted at the 2005 World
Summit was a significant departure from many of the recommendations of the original
ICISS Report, its unanimous approval demonstrated a consensus that there are limits to
state sovereignty, even in the domestic sphere.
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III. Libya

The 2011 intervention in the conflict in Libya exemplifies the evolving
understanding of sovereignty in the 21st century. While the Libyan intervention was not
the first international action demonstrating evolving notions of sovereignty, its rapid
implementation and its reliance on regional approval as opposed to sovereign state
authority demonstrate how much the Westphalian concept of sovereignty has eroded over
the last several decades.
After a background of the Libyan revolution, this chapter will discuss the
passages of Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 as well as the legal framework
behind Resolution 1973’s authorization of the use of force in Libya. It will then delve
into the progression of the intervention authorized by Resolution 1973 followed by a
brief discussion of the military operation’s aftermath. After an analysis of the
implications of Resolution 1973 and the intervention, the chapter will conclude with a
discussion of the relationship between the Libya intervention and the Responsibility to
Protect.
Russian decisions, statements, and reactions surrounding the conflict and
subsequent intervention in Libya are of particular significance for this thesis, and the
background provided by this chapter plays a significant role in later chapters’ analysis of
Russian actions surrounding Libya.
Libyan Intervention Background
Clashes between anti-government protesters and Libyan leader Colonel Muammar
Gaddafi’s security forces began on February 15th, 2011, when protesters gathered in
18

Benghazi to oppose the arrest of human rights activist Fethi Tarbel earlier that week. 71
Violence spread throughout the northern part of the country at a remarkably rapid rate,
claiming a number of lives. 72 Later that week, government forces carried out airstrikes –
while the government claimed that the airstrikes were targeting isolated opposition
weapons storage facilities, 73 witnesses reported that the airstrikes occurred throughout
Tripoli, suggesting the government was targeting civilians. 74 On February 21st, members
of Libya’s mission to the United Nations, including Permanent Representative
Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalgham, officially sided with the rebels and requested that the
UN impose a no-fly zone over the country. 75 Over the next two days, the Arab League
suspended Libya’s membership and the African Union condemned the “indiscriminate
and excessive use of force and lethal weapons against peaceful protesters” 76 in Libya.
Gaddafi responded defiantly, publicly promising to crush a revolution. 77 He vowed to
hunt down the “cockroaches” taking part in the rebellion in Benghazi and warned
protesters that they would be “hunted down door to door and executed.” 78
Gaddafi’s words served as a catalyst for international action regarding the
situation in Libya – the leader’s threatening language converted the “prospect of
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massacre and atrocity” 79 in Libya to a seemingly inevitable reality. United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay released a statement urging both the
Security Council and the Human Rights Council to act, and the Human Rights Council
responded by establishing a fact-finding committee. 80 Pillay also advised that the
“protection of civilians should be the paramount consideration in maintain national order
and the rule of law.” 81 The Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention of
Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect issued a subsequent statement that said, “if the
reported nature and scale of… attacks are confirmed, they may well constitute crimes
against humanity, for which national authorities should be held accountable.” 82 On
February 25th, the Human Rights Council convened a special session to discuss the
human rights situation in Libya, during which High Commissioner Pillay said that the
“Libyan descent into violence and chaos… represented a callous and worsening disregard
for the rights and freedoms of the Libyan people that had been characteristic of the
Libyan leadership for more than four decades.” 83
The Security Council also held a meeting on the 25th, during which SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon briefed Council members on the situation in Libya. He reported
that “more than 1,000 people have been killed as security forces and militiamen loyal to
leader Muammar Gaddafi continued their deadly assault on civilian protesters” 84 and
relayed eyewitness accounts of Gaddafi supporters entering hospitals and killing injured
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protesters and anti-government protesters. 85 The Secretary-General urged the Council to
“consider concrete action” 86 regarding the violence.
On February 26th, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 1970, the first of two major resolutions on the situation in Libya. The
resolution acknowledged the condemnation of the violence by regional organizations
such as the Arab League, the African Union, and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, and subsequently approved a number of non-military actions. The resolution
referred the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), demanded an end to the
violence, permitted states to “facilitate and support” 87 the return of humanitarian aid to
Libyan civilians, placed an arms embargo on Libya, imposed a travel ban on a number of
Libyan officials (including the Gaddafi family), and instituted an assets freeze for foreign
accounts held by the government and the Gaddafi family. 88 Resolution 1970 also
included provisions for a sanctions committee through which Member States were to
report any unilateral sanctions imposed on the Libyan Government.
Two days later, European Union governments approved a number of sanctions
that included travel bans and an arms embargo. 89 The United Nations followed by
unanimously voting to suspend Libya’s membership in the UN Human Rights Council on
March 1st. 90 The next week was particularly violent in Libya, with reports of progovernment forces attacking protesters with mortars and machine guns. 91 On March 7th,
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both the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization of Islamic Conference called for
the UN Security Council to institute a no-fly zone over Libya. 92 Three days later, France
became the first country to recognize the rebel-formed Libyan National Council as
Libya’s legitimate representative body; the Gaddafi government responded by severing
diplomatic ties with France the next day. 93
The Arab League joined other regional organizations in calling for a United
Nations-imposed no-fly zone over Libya on March 12th. Five days later, the Security
Council approved Resolution 1973 which not only instituted the no-fly zone, but also
authorized Member States to take “all necessary means” to protect the Libyan people. On
March 19th, American, French, and British forces launched initial airstrikes targeting
Libyan military facilities. 94 As NATO nations continued to target Libyan Government
forces and movements, the rebels gained traction throughout the country. 95 NATO
operations “quickly expanded into efforts to stymie the Libyan military’s ability to
engage the rebels,” 96 and NATO forces began striking supply centers, transportation
routes, and other key Libyan military targets.
Resolution 1970
In addition to the aforementioned components of Resolution 1970, the document
included the Security Council’s plan to “keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under
continuous review and [to] be prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend, or lift the
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prescribed measures in light of compliance or non-compliance with the resolution.” 97
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon praised the resolution’s unanimous passage, saying that
“while it cannot, by itself, end the violence and the repression, it is a vital step – a clear
expression of the will of a united community of nations,” 98 but added that “even bolder
steps might be necessary.” 99 Speaking after the Secretary-General, a number of Council
members “expressed hope that the resolution was a strong step in affirming the
responsibility of States to protect their people as well as the legitimate role of the Council
to step in when they failed to meet that responsibility.” 100 French representative Gérard
Araud said that the situation’s referral to the ICC would “open a new era in commitment
to the protection of populations.” 101 Council members who are not parties to the Rome
Statute and therefore are not obligated to cooperate with the International Criminal Court
still supported the referral, with Indian representative Hardeep Singh Puri stating that he
believed the ICC’s involvement would “help to bring about the end of violence.” 102
Unsurprisingly, Russian Federation representative Vitaly Churkin “stressed the
importance of affirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya, 103 though this
stipulation did not prevent him from voting in favor of the resolution.
Finally, Libyan representative Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalgham, freshly
defected from the Gaddafi government, said that the “Council’s action represented moral
support for his people and was a signal that an end must be put to the fascist regime in
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Tripoli.” 104 This comment marked the first direct reference within the Security Council to
regime change in Libya, a phenomenon that will be addressed in a later section of this
thesis.
Resolution 1973
When Resolution 1970 did not have any noticeable effect on the Gaddafi regime’s
behavior and violence toward its citizens, the United Nations Security Council
reconvened on March 17th, nineteen days after the passage of Resolution 1970. The
resulting document, Resolution 1973, authorized “Member States, acting nationally or
through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect
civilians under threat of attack in the country.” 105 It also “demanded that Libyan
authorities comply with their obligations under international law and take all measures to
protect civilians and meet their basic needs and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded
passage of humanitarian assistance.” 106 Resolution 1973 passed with ten members
approving the measures and five abstaining.
French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé introduced the resolution and said that as the
world “experienced a wave of great revolutions that would change the course of history,
the will of the Libyan people had been trampled under the feed of the Gaddafi regime.” 107
He pointed out that previous UN attempts at non-intervention measures, namely
Resolution 1970, had been ignored by the Libyan Government and violence against the
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Libyan people had actually increased. 108 The Gaddafi regime had given no indication of
plans to act on international demands to cease the violence against its people.
Representatives who voted in favor of the resolution explained their votes by “agreeing
that the strong action was made necessary because the Gaddafi regime had not heeded the
first actions of the Council… they stressed that the objective was solely to protect
civilians from further harm.” 109
Resolution 1973 heeded the calls of regional organizations, particularly the Arab
League, to institute a no-fly zone. While the Arab League has historically been a
generally anti-interventionist body, its call to the United Nations demonstrated the
severity of the Gaddafi regime’s departure from legitimacy. 110 The Arab League’s
suspension of Libya, as well as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference’s condemnations of the violence, played a significant role in the
passage of Resolution 1973. The aforementioned organizations’ calls for a Security
Council-instituted no-fly zone over Libya affirmed the clear regional consensus regarding
the need for external intervention. 111
In addition to the support of regional organizations, the passage of Resolution
1973 was aided by two other clear factors. The first, which was referenced in a previous
section, was the explicit language used by Gaddafi, who used terms like “execution” and
“cockroaches” when speaking about protesters and members of the rebel groups. 112
Gaddafi’s statements provided tangible evidence of the severity of the threat to Libyan
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civilians, and UN officials became increasingly concerned about the urgency with which
the international community needed to act. 113 The second was the rapid defection of
governmental figures, including Libya’s Permanent Representative to the UN, from
Gaddafi’s government. These defections began as early as late February, and the almost
immediate abandonment of the Gaddafi regime demonstrated the degree to which
Gaddafi had alienated his people. These three major factors created what many analysts
refer to as the “perfect storm” for intervention.
While they did not block the resolution, Russia, China, Brazil, and India all
“expressed misgivings about the content of the resolution” 114 after the vote, with Russian
Federation Representative Churkin expressing concerns about the lack of explicit
definitions of the methods of enforcing the no-fly zone and the limits of force. 115
Legal Framework for the Intervention
While international law generally prohibits the use of force, chapter VII of the UN
Charter states that if non-forceful means, such as economic sanctions, prove inadequate
in situations like the one in Libya, the Security Council “may take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security.” 116 Members of the Security Council saw the situation in Libya as a threat to
international peace and security, and while it was initially surprising that Russia and the
other anti-interventionist states abstained rather than voting against Resolution 1973, the
passage of a resolution authorizing the use of force was “largely unremarkable” 117 due to
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its firm grounding in the UN Charter. The decision to abstain rather than to veto
demonstrates that even Russia and China, normally the strongest voices for refraining
from intervention, recognized the legal framework for the resolution.
Progression of the Libya Intervention
NATO forces began air strikes only two days after the passage of Resolution
1973. As rebels continued to clash with government forces on the ground, the NATO
airstrikes focused on Libyan military targets on both land and sea, with American jets
targeting Libyan Government ships in Misrata. 118 The rebels began urging NATO to take
stronger action as early as April 6th, when rebel General Abdul Fattah Younes “accused
NATO of tardiness and indecision,” 119 and NATO leaders responded by increasing the
rate of NATO attacks on Libyan military targets. 120 Throughout the month of April,
Great Britain, France, and Italy announced that they each planned to send military
advisers to assist the Libyan rebels. 121
On May 4th, International Criminal Court Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo
reported to the Security Council that his investigation had led him to identify three
individuals in the Libyan Government whom he said “appeared to bear the most criminal
responsibility for crimes against humanity” 122 in Libya. Moreno-Ocampo said that “the
evidence collected has confirmed the fears and concerns expressed in Resolution
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1970,” 123 and various Council members offered subsequent statements of support for the
ICC investigation. 124
In early May, rebels in western Libya and in the city of Misrata “complained that
without more intensive and extensive NATO bombardment, they lacked the firepower
and military discipline to take charge on the ground.” 125 After almost six weeks of
military action in Libya, NATO commanders began questioning whether they could
actually fulfill Resolution 1973’s objective of protecting citizens so long as the Gaddafi
regime remained in power. 126 Ultimately, the NATO leadership determined that
expanding the mission to encompass an objective of regime change still fit the initial goal
of citizen protection. Leaders including United States President Barack Obama, who had
initially resisted the notion of regime change in Libya, came to believe that the Libyan
people could only be fully protected and free to exercise political self-determination if
they were freed of “40 years of tyranny… [in order to] start creating the institutions
required for self-determination,” 127 a situation only possible with the removal of the
Gaddafi regime.
The Libyan Government retained strongholds throughout the country as late as
two months after the initial airstrikes, and NATO forces began expanding attacks to
targets in the capital city of Tripoli and throughout the country. 128 This expansion
included bombing of military facilities and the Gaddafi family’s residences. NATO
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publicly stated that these attacks were intended to “reduce Gaddafi’s ability to wage
war.” 129
On June 27th, the International Criminal Court announced arrest warrants for
Colonel Gaddafi, one of his sons, and his intelligence chief on “charges of crimes against
humanity, including murder and persecution, stemming from the first two weeks of the
uprising in Libya.” 130 A few days later, Gaddafi appeared on national television
threatening “attacks on Europe if NATO did not halt its bombing campaign.” 131 Two
days later, the leader of the opposition claimed that Gaddafi had not responded to the
rebels’ offer for him to step down but retain his residence in Libya. 132
With ongoing support from NATO forces and Western countries, rebel forces
continued to make strides against government forces, gaining more territorial control
throughout the summer and early fall. The military campaign lasted until late October,
over seven months after Resolution 1973 was approved by the Security Council.
Aftermath of the Intervention
The countries that abstained from the vote on Resolution 1973, as well as
countries who were not members of the Security Council at the time, expressed concerns
with the escalation of the NATO campaign well before its conclusion in October 2011.
These countries saw the “mission creep” of the military intervention, or the perceived
abuse of the resolution that called for the “protection of civilians,” as a clear
overextension of the statutes of Resolution 1973. 133 Russia, China, Brazil, and India did
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not believe that any interpretation of the language of Resolution 1973 could permit the
campaign’s expansion that had been approved by NATO leadership. 134
Russia attributed this “mission creep” to the West’s desire to overthrow the
Gaddafi regime, accusing the NATO operation of “attacking a broad range of targets
beyond those necessary for the protection of civilians.” 135 Russia accused the West of
instigating a “full-fledged civil war, the humanitarian, social, economic, and military
consequences of which transcend Libyan borders” 136 after fighting increased between
opposition forces and Gaddafi’s military.
While the original language of Resolution 1973 did not limit the intervention to
the city of Benghazi, it specifically mentioned the protection of civilians there. When the
mission continued long after securing Benghazi, and did not conclude until Gaddafi’s
fall, many traditionally anti-intervention countries, with Russia’s criticism remaining the
sharpest, expressed the belief that the intervention was a “front for an operation actually
aimed at regime change” 137 in Libya. While the expansion of NATO operations most
likely did aid in limiting Gaddafi’s ability to continue attacks on the Libyan people, the
issue of proportional use of force remains. The question is whether NATO’s actions,
while stretching the resolution’s objectives, still followed the Security Council’s
mandate, or if the extension of the military campaign overstepped the boundaries and
permissions of Resolution 1973.
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Implications of Resolution 1973 and the Libya Intervention
The passage of Resolution 1973 was notable for a number of reasons, but one of
the most important lessons of the resolution’s approval was of the acceptance of regional
authority as a valid substitute for sovereignty authority. There is some recent basis for
this shift. The Responsibility to Protect doctrine includes emphasis on regional authority
as an important source of legitimacy in any sort of UN intervention, but it is notable that
even Russia acquiesced to the legitimacy of regional authority rather than insisting on the
supremacy of the sovereign authority of Libya. The Arab League, along with a number of
other regional organizations, not only approved of outside intervention in Libya, but
requested swift Security Council action – while Russia, China, and other antiinterventionist states could not support the resolution due to their strong positions against
foreign involvement in intrastate conflicts, this regional appeal and the blatant severity of
the situation seemed to combine to create a situation in which the five countries felt
comfortable simply abstaining.
Speaking after the vote on Resolution 1973, the Chinese representative said,
“China is always against the use of force in international relations… we also attach great
importance to the position of African countries and the AU… In view of this… China
abstained.” 138 Russia also mentioned the Arab League’s request to the Security Council
in its statement regarding abstention, though it did not explicitly explain its abstention at
the time. 139 In addition to the requests submitted by regional organizations, it is worth
noting that three African countries, Nigeria, Gabon, and South Africa, were non138
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permanent members of the Security Council at the time and all voted in favor of
Resolution 1973, adding an additional layer of (semi) regional approval for the
intervention. 140 While it is impossible to know for sure, it is fair to assume that the United
Nations Security Council would not have been able to authorize any sort of intervention
in Libya without clear regional approval for outside intervention.
The concept of regional authority as a valid substitute for sovereign authority
marks a significant departure from traditional Westphalian thinking – the traditional
concept of sovereignty deems any sort of external interference with a nation-state’s
internal affairs as illegitimate, with the implied exception of assistance upon the request
of the nation-state’s official government. If even Russia, generally viewed as the greatest
champion for traditional sovereignty in the modern world, refrains from blocking
international intervention on the basis of regional approval for the action, the traditional,
strict Westphalian form of sovereignty has certainly lost significant traction.
Libya and R2P
Many heralded the Security Council’s passage of Resolution 1973 as proof of the
success of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. After the Security Council’s vote, UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon declared, “the Security Council today has taken an
historic decision. Resolution 1973 affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international
community’s determination to fulfill its responsibility to protect civilians from violence
perpetrated upon them by their own government.” 141 He later said, “By now it should be
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clear to all that the Responsibility to Protect has arrived.” 142 R2P advocates Alex Bellamy
and Paul Williams described Resolution 1973 as a sign of a Security Council shift to a
“new politics of protection,” 143 and R2P architect Gareth Evans called the Libya
intervention a “textbook case of the R2P norm working exactly as it was supposed to.” 144
One notable element of the Resolution 1973 text itself was the absence of words
such as “unique” or “exceptional” to describe the situation in Libya. 145 Past resolutions
authorizing interventions included such language, presumably to avoid setting any sort of
precedent and to maintain the practice of “case-by-case” consideration for determining
the legitimacy of international intervention. Resolution 794, endorsing action under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter in Somalia in 1992, noted the “unique character of the
present situation in Somalia,” 146 and Resolution 940, authorizing an intervention to
reinstate Haiti’s elected president in 1994, described the situation in Haiti as
“extraordinary” and “requiring an exceptional response.” 147 The absence of such
language from Resolution 1973 may demonstrate a shift in the environment of the
Security Council and the dialogue of intervention.
Resolution 1973 certainly seems to fit the spirit behind Responsibility to Protect.
The final resolution repeatedly referenced the Gaddafi regime’s gross human rights
violations and the clear need to aid the Libyan people. Resolution 1973 mentioned the
Libyan Government’s failure to heed the warnings of the sanction-inducing Resolution
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1970 of a few weeks earlier, and it portrayed the no-fly zone as essential to the goal of
protecting Libyan civilians. When analyzed in isolation from other factors and patterns,
Resolution 1973 and the subsequent intervention seem to be exactly what SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon and R2P’s advocates hoped: an ideal example of a doctrine of
protection and dual-sovereignty becoming an international norm.
However, the intervention in Libya does not necessarily constitute the “textbook”
case that Gareth Evans and his fellow R2P proponents seem to believe. First and
foremost, neither Resolution 1970 nor Resolution 1973 made any reference to the
international community’s responsibility to Libya’s citizens – the only mention of
“responsibility” was in reference to the Libyan Government’s responsibility to its own
citizens. Even these statements of Libyan responsibility appeared only in the preambles
of both resolutions, rather than in the main texts. 148
Second, when comparing Resolution 1973 to past resolutions authorizing
international action in intrastate conflicts, it seems less revolutionary than many R2P
supporters believe. In comparing the texts of Resolutions 1973 and 794, the two
resolutions seem incredibly similar, despite Resolution 794 passing over a decade prior to
the introduction of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Resolution 1973 reads,
“…determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a
threat to international peace and security,” 149 invoking the language of Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. Resolution 794 reads almost identically, stating, “…determining that the
magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia… constitutes a threat
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to international peace and security.” 150 The phrase “international peace and security” is
essentially necessary in order to clearly invoke Chapter VII of the Charter, and its
prominent inclusion in resolutions in both the pre-R2P era and the post-R2P era shows
the unwavering supremacy of intervention under Chapter VII. Addressing the situations
themselves, Resolution 1973 says, “…expressing grave concern at the deteriorating
situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties,” 151 while
Resolution 794 reads, “…gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian
situation in Somalia.” 152 The similarity of these two statements demonstrates that the
Security Council did not suddenly start using humanitarian strife as a justification for
intervention after the introduction of R2P. While R2P certainly contributed to the
elevation of human rights and civilian protections as concerns of the international
community, the language used in the two resolutions was very similar regardless of the
introduction of R2P prior to Resolution 1973. Both resolutions mention the efforts and
opinions of regional organizations including the Arab League and the Organization of
Islamic Conference, and both emphasize the need for ease of access for humanitarian aid.
It is difficult to say exactly what role R2P played in the passage of Resolution
1973. The Security Council’s authorization of the use of force in Libya was certainly not
the first authorization of its kind, though it was the first to pass on the basis of regional
consent as a substitute for sovereign consent. It is misleading to claim Resolution 1973 as
a victory for R2P or evidence of R2P’s acceptance as a norm, as there is no distinct
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evidence in the either the text of the resolution or the transcript of the Security Council
meeting on March 17th that points to this claim.
However, it is also unwise to assume that R2P played no role in the rapid Security
Council action in Libya. In the February 26th Security Council meeting during which
resolution 1970 passed, many Council members “expressed hope that the resolution was
a strong step in affirming the responsibility of States to protect their people as well as the
legitimate role of the Council to step in when they failed to meet that responsibility.” 153
While this language is not identical to the language of the Responsibility to Protect
doctrine, it echoes a similar sentiment.
The debate over whether Resolution 1973 constitutes a success for the
establishment of an R2P norm, however, seems relatively moot given the significant
contention regarding the direction the intervention took. Some critics of the intervention
even suggested that R2P was “used as a smokescreen for regime change,” 154 a notion that
obviously weakens R2P’s status. Even former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, a
strong proponent of R2P since its inception, acknowledged that “the way the
‘responsibility to protect’ was used in Libya caused a problem for the concept” 155 in a
July 2012 interview. Setbacks to the acceptance of R2P have been clearly evidenced in
the handling of the Syrian crisis by the international community.
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IV. Syria

If the Responsibility to Protect faced a setback in the intervention in Libya, it has
been nearly extinguished in the ongoing conflict in Syria. After three years of fighting,
the Syrian Civil War’s death toll is estimated at around 150,000 156 with an additional
2,662,000 registered Syrian refugees 157 living either in refugee camps in Egypt, Jordan,
Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey or as temporary residents of a handful of Western nations. The
tragic story that is the Syrian Civil War, and the equally tragic and somewhat horrific
story that is the international community’s inaction, demonstrate that there is more than
meets the eye when it comes to standards of sovereignty and the Responsibility to
Protect.
This chapter will first outline a detailed history of the Syrian Civil War followed
by an account of the Syrian refugee situation since March 2011. Next, it will describe the
United Nations Security Council’s activities surrounding the Syrian Civil War, including
details about the two draft resolutions vetoed by Russia and China in October 2011 and
February 2012. The chapter will then go into possible next steps for the international
community in dealing with the Syrian crisis, and will conclude with an analysis of the
relationship between the Responsibility to Protect and the civil war in Syria.
Syrian Civil War Background
Much like the mass protests and subsequent regime change in Tunisia began
when a fruit vendor set himself on fire in protest of police abuse, the now three-year long
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civil war in Syria began with a very small incident. Unrest had been mounting in Syria as
early as January 2011, 158 and a number of protests began throughout Syria in mid-March
2011 when groups gathered in Damascus and Aleppo calling for democratic reforms. 159
However, it was a group of young boys that caused the spark to ignite a fire. In early
March, a group of teenagers was arrested and imprisoned after being caught drawing
political graffiti in the southern Syrian city of Daraa. As community members already
unhappy with the government caught wind of the teens’ ongoing imprisonment, protests
broke out in Daraa and subsequently turned violent on March 18th, 2011 – just one day
after the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1973 and the intervention in Libya.
On that day, Syrian security forces opened fire and killed four protesters. 160 A little over
a week later, thousands of Syrians in the capital city of Damascus and throughout the
country engaged in a “Day of Dignity” on March 25th, demanding the release of political
prisoners. The Assad government initially responded by announcing a series of reforms
including a salary increase for state employees, the impending lifting of Syria’s almost
fifty-year old state of emergency, and the legal licensing of new political parties. 161 Five
days later, President Assad appeared on national television acknowledging the
government’s shortcomings, but failing to suggest any specific reforms – the state of
emergency was not mentioned or lifted at the time. 162
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During the initial weeks of unrest, the Assad government continually blamed
“armed gangs and terrorists” 163 for the protests. On March 30th, Assad alleged that his
country was “facing a grand conspiracy by imperialist forces… Internal conspirators
were spreading lies about the government, inciting sectarian tension and using violence
against government security forces.” 164 Throughout April, government forces were
deployed throughout the country to suppress mounting protests. 165 In one instance,
hundreds of protesters gathered in Daraa and were met by Syrian Government forces,
including snipers on the roofs of buildings. 166 When protesters ignored a roadblock,
soldiers opened fire, killing an unknown number of civilians, many of whom were said to
have been carrying olive branches as symbols of peaceful intentions. 167 On April 21st,
Assad lifted the state of emergency and declared that Syrians had a right to peaceful
protest as a “basic human right guaranteed by the Syrian Constitution.” 168 The lifting of
the state of emergency was widely regarded as a shallow reform, as Syrian forces
retained significant power in containing protests. 169 Rather ironically, the next day was
one of the bloodiest days of the young revolution, with government forces killing up to
100 protesters (reported numbers vary) in Daraa and Damascus. 170 These contrasting
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events matched an established pattern – Assad’s government consistently announced
plans for reform on the day before a large-scale protest was planned in an attempt to
appease protesters. 171 Taking a slightly different angle in attempts to stop the movement,
Assad announced a ban on foreign journalists in Syria, and reports flowed out of the
country that “anyone attempting to film or otherwise report on events since mid-March
had been subject to arrest and torture by the security forces.” 172
On April 27th, the UN Human Rights Council held a meeting to discuss the
situation in Syria, at which reliable sources relayed reports of “artillery fire against
unarmed civilians, door-to-door arrest campaigns, the shooting of medical personnel who
attempt to aid the wounded, raids against hospitals, clinics, and mosques, and the
purposeful destruction of medical supplies and arrests of medical personnel.” 173
Protests persisted and government violence against protesters increased, with
army tanks arriving in Homs, Daraa, and parts of Damascus in early May. 174 On May
18th, the United States imposed sanctions against President Assad and six other Syrian
officials. On June 4th, clashes broke out between protesters and security forces in the
northern city of Jisr ash-Shugur near the Turkish border, and these clashes brought about
the first reports of soldiers who refused to fire on civilians being killed by their
colleagues, which caused some defections from the security forces. 175
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In early July, a mass protest in Hama province resulted in a civilian death toll of
220, which combined with deaths elsewhere in the country to create a death toll of 287,
making July 12th the bloodiest day in the uprising by more than one hundred deaths. 176
The next day, Syrian state television reported on the massacre, blaming “armed terrorists
groups… shooting indiscriminately at the people… after calls from the people of the
village, the security forces clashed with the terrorist groups, arresting a number of
them…” 177
This massacre occurred only a day after the defection of Syrian diplomat Nawaf
al-Fares, the former Syrian ambassador to Iraq and a high-profile member of the Assad
government. Al-Fares told Al Jazeera that he had always sympathized with the
revolution, but had not yet publicly voiced his support because he still “had hope” as he
maintained contact with President Assad. 178 The defected official went on to call Assad
the “former Syrian president, because he is a criminal and he is killing the Syrian
people.” 179
At the end of July, some of the aforementioned defectors from the Syrian army
formed the Free Syrian Army, which began operations in August with around 10,000
forces aimed at overthrowing the Assad regime. 180 This marked the first formation of an
official opposition group, and sealed any doubts that the uprisings had become a full
revolution in the months since a group of teenagers were arrested for political graffiti.
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Two days after the leadership of the Free Syrian Army announced its formation,
government forces cracked down on protesters nationwide in what was called the
Ramadan Massacre, which left 142 people dead and hundreds injured. 181
The international community became increasingly concerned with the situation in
Syria throughout the month of August. On the 18th, United States President Barack
Obama publicly called for President Assad to step down, remarking that “we [the
American Government] have consistently said that President Assad must lead a
democratic transition or get out of the way. He has not led. For the sake of the Syrian
people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.” 182 President Obama added
that the United States:
…cannot and will not impose this transition upon Syria. It is up to the Syrian
people to choose their own leaders… What the United States will support is an
effort to bring out a Syria that is democratic, just, and inclusive for all Syrians.
We will support this outcome by pressuring President Assad to get out of the way
of this transition. 183
Obama then announced sweeping economic sanctions in addition to a freeze of all Syrian
Government assets on American soil and a ban on new American spending, including
investments and spending on Syrian petroleum products. 184 Coordinating with the United
States, British Prime Minister David Cameron, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and
German Chancellor Angela Merkel issued a joint statement echoing Obama’s call, adding
that “Assad should face the reality of the complete rejection of his regime by the Syrian
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people.” 185 By the end of August, almost six months after the initial violence in Syria, at
least 1,583 civilians and 369 security troops had been killed in the country. 186
In September, the European Union expanded on previous economic sanctions by
banning the import of Syrian oil – in 2010 EU Member States imported about 95% of all
the oil exported by Syria. 187 In early October, a number of Syrian opposition groups
formed the Syrian National Council, established to “offer a credible alternative to the
Syrian government and… serve as a single point of contact for the international
community.” 188 Two days later, Russia and China cited references to economic sanctions
as cause for vetoing the first of two major UN Security Council draft resolutions. 189 The
draft condemned human rights violations in Syria, called for a new, peaceful political
process, and demanded an end to violence in the country. 190 As violence and death tolls
increased over the next month, the Arab League announced on November 12th that it had
voted to suspend Syria’s membership. The League gave Syria three days to comply with
a set of demands, including an immediate end to violence, the withdrawal of troops from
cities throughout the country, the release of political prisoners, and the acceptance of
Arab League observers to monitor the situation and ensure the completion of accelerated
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political reform. 191 After three days of noncompliance, the Arab League officially
suspended Syria, urged its members to remove their ambassadors from Damascus, and
imposed a set of economic sanctions and travel bans. Syrian officials rejected the
sanctions, accusing the Arab League of taking part in a “Western-inspired conspiracy.” 192
The International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, established by the UN Human
Rights Council in August, released a report on its fact-finding mission on November 23rd.
The report concluded that the human rights violations committed by the Syrian military
since March were severe enough that the Commission determined that the Syrian
Government was “responsible for the commission of crimes against humanity.” 193 The
report noted that in the not-yet-over month of November alone, the Syrian military had
used force in operations in five major cities, including Damascus and Homs, and had
targeted events such as funeral processions and peaceful public assemblies. 194 The report
included extensive reports of arbitrary detainment, interrogation, and torture, including
accounts of children being tortured to death. 195 The Commission’s diagnosis read, “…the
sheer scale and consistent pattern of attacks by military and security forces on civilians
and civilian neighborhoods and the widespread destruction of property could only be
possible with the approval or complicity of the state.” 196 The UN Human Rights Council
subsequently adopted Resolution S-18/1, which condemned the Syrian Government’s
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violence and referred the report to all UN bodies with the hopes of “appropriate
action.” 197
A week later, Turkey followed the example set by the Arab League and
announced a series of sanctions against Syria. On December 19th, Syrian Foreign
Minister Wallid Moallem announced that the Syrian Government had signed an Arab
League proposal that established an observer mission to Syria in an attempt to reach an
end to the violence. 198 Three days later, 150 Arab League monitors arrived in the country,
but there was no evidence that the mission had any effect on the violence in Syria and the
mission was suspended a month later. 199
On February 4th, 2012, a second UN Security Council resolution failed to pass due
to another double-veto by Russia and China. This draft resolution called on both the
Syrian Government and the opposition to immediately cease all violence – the inclusion
of the opposition in this call was meant to placate Russia’s concerns with UN action
disproportionately targeting the Syrian Government despite the opposition’s use of
violence. 200 Two days after the draft resolution’s failure, the United States closed its
embassy in Syria and brought all of its diplomats back to Washington. The Gulf
Cooperation Council followed suit a day later, announcing that its six states would all be
recalling their ambassadors from Syria and subsequently expelling Syrian diplomats from
their own capitals. 201 Proving itself more responsive than the Security Council, the UN
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General Assembly passed a nonbinding resolution on February 16th endorsing the Arab
League’s plan for Assad stepping down. 202
On April 1st, a group of countries (including the United States, France, and
Turkey) known as the “Friends of the Syrian People” held a conference in Istanbul where
the group announced its recognition of the Syrian National Council as the legitimate
voice of the Syrian people. 203 A few days later, the Syrian Government announced that it
had succeeded in regaining control over the whole country and would participate in a
Kofi Annan-proposed ceasefire, but spokespeople for rebel groups reported that
“government forces continue[d] to slaughter civilians and attack rebel strongholds.” 204
In May, the UN Human Rights Council released an updated report, warning of an
“increasingly militarized” 205 conflict that had transitioned from government forces
attacking protesters to Syrian forces facing “armed and well-organized fighters.” 206 At
the end of the month, Syrian forces attacked towns near Homs, massacring hundreds
including at least 32 children under the age of 10. 207
On June 13th, the UN Security Council authorized an unarmed military observer
mission in Syria, tasked with monitoring the supposed ceasefire in place since midApril. 208 Originally intended to last ninety days, the UN suspended the mission after only
three days due to escalating violence. 209 The next week, Syrian Government forces shot
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down a Turkish jet, which resulted in an emergency NATO meeting but no external
action. 210
The month of July marked a turning point in the Syrian conflict, when the
International Committee of the Red Cross determined that the conflict was no longer
limited to only parts of Syria but had spread throughout the entire country. 211 At the end
of July, Khaled al-Ayoubi, a top Syrian diplomat in London, defected from the Assad
government, saying that “he [was] no longer willing to represent a regime that has
committed such violent and oppressive acts against its own people.” 212 Exactly one week
later, Syrian Prime Minister Riyad al-Hijab resigned and announced his defection from
Assad’s government. 213 Massacres continued throughout the country, with individual
events boasting death tolls in the hundreds. The UN Human Rights Council labeled the
Syrian military’s aforementioned May massacre in Homs that claimed the lives of many
children as a war crime. 214 In October, the Syrian Government agreed to a ceasefire, but
the short-lived agreement lasted only four days according to reports of violence
throughout the country. 215
In another attempt to organize, various opposition factions united in November to
form the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. As rebels
continued to persist in clashes with government forces, opposition forces captured a
number of military bases near Damascus in December. 216
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Massacres of civilians continued throughout December and while members of the
international community continued to condemn the Syrian Government’s use of violence,
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told the new UN Special Envoy Lakhdar
Brahimi that “there was no way to persuade Assad to resign.” 217
On January 6th, 2013, Assad confirmed Lavrov’s statement by announcing that he
would not step down, but rather sought to institute a new constitution and eliminate
support for the opposition, which he again referred to as “terrorists.” 218 The discovery of
65 bodies in Aleppo on January 29th and the massacre of over a hundred civilians in
attacks on two villages provided proof that Assad’s government showed no signs of
ceasing its violence against its people. 219 In early February, the Security Council released
a statement estimating the civilian death toll to be nearing 70,000. 220
In April, the United States announced that it had evidence of small scale usage of
the chemical weapon sarin in Syria, a claim echoed by Great Britain and France in a
formal message to the United Nations. 221 In mid-May, thousands of Hezbollah fighters
traveled to Syria from Lebanon to aid the Syrian military in the struggle against the rebel
groups. 222 On May 27th, the European Union lifted its arms embargo against the Syrian
rebels, enabling a surge in foreign arms supply to opposition fighters.
The month of June marked an important shift in the fighting in Syria, as reports
reached the international community of rebel groups killing civilians. 223 On June 13th,
President Obama announced that the United States had determined that the Syrian
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Government was responsible for the use of sarin against rebel groups and stated that the
Assad regime had “crossed a red line” by employing chemical weapons. 224 The Obama
Administration subsequently increased its support for rebel groups, including direct US
military support. 225 On the same day, the United Nations reported that almost 93,000
people had been killed in Syria since the outbreak of violence over two years earlier. 226
In August, the UN sent a group of weapons inspectors to Syria to investigate the
claims made by the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Syrian opposition that
the government had employed chemical weapons against rebels and civilians. Three days
after the team’s arrival in Syria, activist groups in the country reported that an August 21st
chemical weapons attack on civilians in Damascus resulted in the deaths of over 1,300
people. 227 These claims were substantiated by video footage, witness reports, and Doctors
Without Borders’ announcement that hospitals near Damascus treated thousands of
people suffering from “neurotoxic symptoms” on the day of the attack. 228 UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon and US officials alike called for accountability in the attacks.
In late August, the United States prepared for a possible strike on Syria in
response to the Syrian Government’s use of chemical weapons. A day after the UK
Parliament voted against taking military action in Syria, US Secretary of State John Kerry
announced that the death toll of the August 21st chemical weapons attack had reached
1,429, including over 400 children. 229 The next day, President Obama asked Congress to
authorize US military action in Syria. After intense international negotiations, the Syrian
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Government agreed to give up control of its chemical weapons per a Russian request on
September 9th, and President Obama appeared on national television the next day stating
that he would no longer put “American boots on the ground in Syria,” though he would
not eliminate other possible military options. 230 A few days later, the US and Russia
announced a joint plan to remove chemical weapons from Syria. The UN chemical
weapons inspectors’ report was released on September 16th and included “clear and
convincing evidence” 231 of the suspected use of sarin on August 21st.
On September 27th, the Security Council succeeded in passing its first resolution
regarding Syria, requiring the Assad regime to eliminate its chemical weapons
stockpile. 232 Over the next few weeks, the Syrian Government began eliminating its
chemical weapon production facilities as well as its arsenal under the supervision of the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which announced the completion
of the facility elimination on October 31st. 233
The UN announced in November that a conference referred to as “Geneva II”
would convene on January 22nd in Geneva, where the Syrian Government and a set of
opposition groups were to meet with international mediators to negotiate an end to the
violence. At the beginning of December, the UN announced that a fact-finding team
found “massive evidence that the highest levels of the Syrian government are responsible
for war crimes.” 234 In early January 2014, the United Nations announced that it would
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discontinue its death toll count, as it no longer felt it could verify its data. 235 Opening the
Geneva II conference on January 22nd, US Secretary of State Kerry insisted that President
Assad would have no role in a transitional government in Syria. 236
Despite Syria’s timely completion of the destruction of chemical weapons
facilities in October 2013, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
announced on February 13th that Syria had only shipped 11% of its stockpile out of the
country, despite a February 5th deadline for complete removal of chemical weapons. 237
On February 22nd, 2014, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 2139, demanding an increase in the ease of delivery of humanitarian
assistance, a safe passage for civilians wishing to leave Syria, and the respect of the
“principle of medical neutrality.” 238
Syrian Refugees
As the violence on the ground in Syria raged on, the Syrian refugee situation
continued to grow and place an increasing burden on Syria’s neighbors. Refugees began
fleeing to Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan as early as April 2011, 239 and by March 2012,
there were over 14,000 registered refugees in Turkey. 240 In that month, the United
Nations Human Rights Council appointed a Regional Refugee coordinator for Syrian
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Refugees. 241 In April 2012, the new Domiz Refugee Camp opened in Iraq, which
eventually became the largest refugee camp in the country. 242
At the beginning of July 2012, increased fighting in Aleppo caused almost
200,000 Syrians to flee the country, many of whom went to Turkey. 243 Two weeks later,
fighting in Damascus led to a mass movement of Syrian refugees across the border into
Lebanon, with estimates ranging from 18,000 to 40,000 individuals leaving the country
over the course of just a few days. 244 Anticipating further demand for refugee space,
Jordan opened the Za’atari Refugee Camp, which has since become Jordan’s fourth
largest city with 104,494 registered refugees in the camp as of April 10th, 2014. 245
In September 2012, the UN Human Rights Council reported that more than
11,000 Syrian refugees arrived in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon in a 24 hour period. 246
Late that year, the Syrian refugee situation only continued to worsen, with reports of
tuberculosis among refugees in Lebanon and a UN Refugee Agency request for $1 billion
to assist Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, and Egypt in supporting the half a million Syrian
refugees who had fled the violence. 247
The United Nations Human Rights Council estimated that by February 2013, the
conflict was driving 5,000 people out of Syria each day, with a total of almost 800,000
refugees occupying refugee camps in neighboring countries. 248 This number was revised
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only five weeks later, with the number of Syrian refugees passing the 1 million mark. 249
Just a few months later, on July 16th, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
announced that the refugee flow out of Syria, averaging around 6,000 people per day,
was the most significant rate since the Rwandan genocide in the 1990’s. 250 A month later,
almost 20,000 refugees poured out of Syria into Iraq over the course of only a few days
and an additional 30,000 in the subsequent week and a half. 251
On September 1st, 2013, UNICEF announced that in just seven months, the
number of Syrian refugees had doubled and passed the 2 million mark, including almost
1 million children – one year earlier, the total number was a seemingly small 230,000. 252
Throughout the fall of 2013, a number of European and North American countries
announced plans to house refugees in a variety of manners, ranging from temporary
resettlement to permanent residency. 253 On December 16th, 2013, the United Nations
estimated that the Syrian need for humanitarian aid will expand to three-quarters of the
country’s 22.4 million citizens by the end of 2014, and that this expanded need will
require an additional $6.5 billion.254 In February 2014, UNICEF issued an urgent plea for
donor support to aid the almost 10,000 Syrian children suffering from malnutrition in
refugee camps in Lebanon. 255
Syria and the United Nations Security Council
Since the conflict in Syria began in March 2011, the United Nations Security
Council has only been able to agree on three actions. The first was the short-lived
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observer mission in June 2013, which lasted only three of an intended ninety days. The
second was the September 2013 resolution that required the Syrian Government to
eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile, and the third was the humanitarian aid-focused
Resolution 2139 that passed in February 2014. This minimal action cannot be attributed
to a single factor, but one important element of the Security Council’s general inability to
act has been conflicting views of the conflict within the Permanent 5 members.
From the beginning of the conflict, the West has viewed the events in Syria in a
manner distinct from the views of Russia, China, and other Security Council members.
Starting in March 2011, the West viewed the Syrian situation as “brutal repression of prodemocracy protesters by the Assad regime,” 256 while Russia and China “emphasized that
violence was occurring in the context of a legitimate government response to attacks on
state infrastructure by armed opposition groups.” 257 These initial appraisals have had an
obvious influence on the two groups’ handling of the developing conflict – while the
West has repeatedly called for Assad to step down, Russia and China have remained
steadfast in their opposition to external pressure for regime change. 258 These stances are
apparent throughout the narrative of the uprising in Syria that has become a full-fledged
civil war, and the Security Council’s failure to take any sort of real action is largely a
result of these conflicting and unwavering views within the P5.
The Security Council first met to discuss the worsening situation in Syria on April
27th, 2011, when each Council member expressed deep concern but with different
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emphases and solutions. 259 Russia used its time to remind the Council that the violence in
Syria did not constitute a threat to international peace and security, demonstrating a clear
concern about the possibility of attempts to intervene. 260 Two days later, the UN Human
Rights Council convened a special meeting on Syria and produced Resolution S-16/1,
which “strongly condemned the use of lethal violence against peaceful protesters.” 261 The
resolution also called on the Syrian Government to immediately cease human rights
abuses, which included violations of political and civil rights in addition to violence and
force.
First Security Council Draft Resolution (Vote on October 4th, 2011)
On May 25th, 2011, France, Germany, Portugal, and Great Britain submitted a
draft resolution on Syria. The resolution would condemn the Syrian Government’s
crackdown on protesters and civilians, while also attempting to remind the Syrian
Government of its “responsibility to protect” its citizens. 262 The draft “stressed the need
for those responsible for government-sponsored violence to be brought to account and
called for an end to killings, arbitrary detention, disappearances, and torture.” 263 The draft
also demanded that restrictions on communications and media in Syria be lifted and that
the Syrian Government cooperate with the Human Rights Council’s independent
investigative mission. The BRIC nations along with South Africa expressed reservations
regarding any Security Council resolution that “seeks to dictate the nature of the reform
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program that the Syrian Government should undertake.” 264 As the members of the
Security Council discussed an amended form of the original draft resolution, Russia and
China continued to raise concerns about any language that could allow for broad
interpretation – an obvious attempt to prevent repetition of Resolution 1973 and the
perceived mission creep of the NATO intervention in Libya. 265
As time went on however, the second major part of Russia’s opinion of the
situation in Syria seemed to lose traction. Russia continually made a point to remind the
rest of the Security Council that the situation in Syria did not constitute a threat to
international peace and security, but as refugees poured over Syria’s borders onto the
land of its neighbors, the conflict became an international concern. 266
Negotiations remained unproductive for several months, until the President of the
Security Council, Hardeep Singh Puri of India, issued a presidential statement on August
3rd. The statement condemned human rights violations in Syria and called on both the
Syrian Government and the opposition to immediately end violence. The statement
insisted that the only real solution to the conflict would be an internal political process
aimed at representing the Syrian people in a legitimate fashion. 267
Nearly six months after the draft resolution’s initial introduction, France,
Germany, Portugal, and Great Britain introduced the final amended draft of their
resolution on October 4th, 2011. This draft was the result of months of negotiations and
made clear compromises in an attempt to appease Russia and its fellow skeptics,
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including the elimination of sections regarding sanctions. 268 The new draft did not
authorize any sort of Security Council action and instead focused on statements of
demands. The resolution:
…recalled the Syrian Government’s responsibility to protect its population;
regretted the Government’s lack of progress in introducing its promised reforms;
and expressed its deep concern with respect to the deteriorating political situation
in Syria and the prospect of a further escalation of violence. [The resolution]
demanded an immediate end to the violence; the restoration of freedom of
expression and assembly; the cessation of the use of lethal force against civilians;
and the government’s support for the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis that
had resulted from the continuing conflict. It called for an inclusive Syrian-led
political process, conducted free from fear and intimidation, to address the
legitimate concerns of Syria’s population. As in the Libyan case, the resolution
called for the Arab league to use its influence to end the violence. 269
The draft resolution failed to pass after a double-veto from China and Russia, despite the
resolution’s relatively weak language and lack of direct action.
Russian Representative Vitaly Churkin outlined a number of reasons for Russia’s
veto. First, he insisted that the resolution ignored the “logic of respect for the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria as well as the principle of non-intervention,
including military, in its affairs.” 270 He also complained that “his country’s emphasis on
the non-acceptability of military intervention had not been taken into account,” 271 even
though the resolution’s only reference to Article 41 (Chapter VII) was in a section
discussing a review of the resolution’s effectiveness after thirty days. 272 Second, Russia
saw the resolution as confrontational rather than based on a “clear preference for even268
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handed dialogue amongst Syrian parties aimed at achieving peace and national agreement
concerning the reforms necessary to advance the country’s social and political life.” 273
Churkin’s third point directly reflected Russia’s initial reaction to the conflict and the
view of the opposition evenly sharing the blame for violence being inflicted on Syrians –
Russia felt that the resolution disproportionately targeted the government rather than the
opposition. 274 Finally, Churkin made a passionate statement about the role of the Libyan
intervention in the consideration of action in Syria, expressing deep concern that the
generous interpretation of Resolution 1973 employed by NATO in Libya was to set an
example for future Security Council resolutions. 275 He said,
…Our proposals for wording on the non-acceptability of foreign military
intervention were not taken into account [in the final version of the draft
resolution], and, based on the well-known events in North Africa, that can only
put us on our guard…The international community is alarmed by statements that
compliance with UNSC [UN Security Council] resolution on Libya in the NATO
interpretation is a model for the future actions of NATO in implementing the
responsibility to protect. It is easy to see that today’s “Unified Protector”
[NATO’s Libyan operation] model could happen in Syria… these types of models
should be excluded from global practices once and for all. 276
American Representative Susan Rice responded with noticeable anger and
disappointment, saying, “Others claim that strong Security Council action on Syria would
merely be a pretext for military intervention. Let there be no doubt: this is not about
military intervention; this is not about Libya. That is a cheap ruse by those who would
rather sell arms to the Syrian regime than stand with the Syrian people.” 277
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Second Security Council Draft Resolution (Vote on February 4th, 2011)
Several weeks passed and as violence increased and the Human Rights Council’s
fact-finding commission returned with a very grim diagnosis of the situation in Syria, the
Human Rights Council adopted Resolution S-18/1 on December 2nd, recommending that
all UN bodies examine the commission’s report and commending the recent Arab League
initiative aimed at promoting peaceful resolution in Syria.
The Security Council reconvened on the issue of Syria on December 12th, when
the High Commissioner for Human Rights updated the Council members in an informal,
informational session regarding the situation on the ground. 278 Over the next month,
Security Council members began discussing the development of a new resolution based a
draft resolution submitted by the Arab League. The Arab League resolution was
aggressive and included a step-by-step outline for governmental transition in Syria. 279
Unsurprisingly, such a blatant example of attempted external influence on regime
change in Syria was unacceptable to Russia, but Russia’s criticism of the Arab League
draft extended to its concerns about the possibility of Western countries interpreting the
language to justify further measures against the Assad regime. 280 Despite these
significant concerns, Russia did not reject the Arab League resolution completely.
Morocco subsequently introduced a new resolution loosely based on the Arab League
proposal – the new draft eliminated the aforementioned plan for power transition and
instead included a “general statement of support” for the League’s actions regarding
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Syria. 281 The new resolution also eliminated the Arab League’s suggestion of economic
sanctions and included “explicit [language] stating that the resolution did not authorize
any sort of coercive action.” 282
On the night before the vote, government forces launched rocket attacks on Homs,
shelling surrounding rebel-heavy areas “without regard for any distinction between rebel
fighters and civilians.” 283 In the conflict’s bloodiest weekend to date, over 200 people
were killed and hundreds were wounded at the hands of the Assad Government. 284 The
next day, thirteen members of the Security Council voted in favor of Morocco’s draft
resolution, but Russia and China blocked its passage with a second double-veto. Unlike
the case of the last double-veto, Russia did not provide a robust explanation – Churkin
simply said that the resolution was unbalanced due to its failure to explicitly assign equal
blame to both the Syrian Government and to the rebel forces. 285 Also unlike previous
vetoes/abstentions, Russia and China were no longer joined by countries like Brazil,
India, and South Africa. Instead, these countries all voted in favor of the resolution as
they each felt that their own concerns about Syrian sovereignty had been alleviated with
the newest draft. 286
What Can Be Done?
It is difficult to offer any sort of prescription for UN action in Syria, as there are
relatively limited options. On a non-military level, the Security Council could mimic its
initial actions in Libya and refer the Syrian case to the International Criminal Court, but
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Syria is not party to the Rome Statute and therefore neither Assad nor any of his top
officials could be prosecuted. 287 On the military side, there seem to be no innovative
options available. While a no-fly zone could contribute to a reduction in the Assad
regime’s ability to attack from the air, 288 the vast majority of the violence targeting
civilians has been on the ground and perpetrated by troops with firearms rather than with
heavy machinery from the air. Another difficulty in dealing with Syria is that the Syrian
opposition ranges from secular, pro-democracy groups to religious extremists, so while
the West has previously provided small arms to opposition groups, it would be extremely
difficult to ensure that any more effective or advanced weaponry provided by the
international community actually remained in the hands of the secular groups. 289
Violence in Syria has escalated to a point that seems to necessitate boots-on-the-ground
should an intervention occur. However, the significant criticisms of the intervention in
Libya render NATO involvement on the ground extremely unlikely. 290
Unfortunately, it appears that Russia will not allow any of the aforementioned
actions – Moscow remains opposed to any solution that extends beyond direct diplomatic
resolutions with special care taken to respect Syrian sovereignty. In an interview with
private Russian news agency Interfax on December 18th, 2013, Russia’s Deputy Foreign
Minister and Special Representative for Middle East Settlement Mikhail Bogdanov
attacked the West for continuing to solely blame the Syrian Government for the violence
in the country. He said,
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Attempts to find some pretext [for external intervention] have been observed
repeatedly over the nearly three years of the crisis. First, they were saying that the
regime had been using heavy weapons and aviation and that this was absolutely
unacceptable, so measures had to be taken… this was an attempt to repeat the
Libyan scenario, that is to give legitimacy to outside interference in Syrian affairs.
Some forces, unfortunately, still believe that the parity and balance that emerged
in the military sphere as result of military confrontation can only be resolved with
the help of outside interference. 291
These statements, made at the end of 2013, reflect the Russians’ unwavering opposition
to essentially anything that remotely resembles the Libya intervention – they view any
attempt to intervene as an attempt to repeat Libya. In describing the conflict in Syria in
simple terms, Bogdanov said,
The opposition is engaged in a power struggle with the current leadership and, in
theory, of course, criticism of the government in any country is based on some
real arguments: Someone does not like something. But that is a different question.
That is a question of their own constructive socioeconomic and political programs
– what they bring to the negotiations, what they bring as they enter the political
struggle, and how they see the future of Syria. 292
This statement takes the Russian insistence on equally shared blame between the two
sides to an extreme – Bogdanov reduces the conflict between opposition forces and the
Syrian Government to a matter of “someone not liking something.” The argument that
such a conflict is really just a matter of internal political decisions seems invalidated by
the government’s excessive use of force against civilians. While Russia maintains that the
West simply automatically jumps to conclusions about the Assad regime’s culpability,
United Nations investigations and fact-finding missions have consistently confirmed the
West’s assertions that the government is to blame for the majority of the violence and
deaths in Syria.
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Bogdanov’s statements exemplify the core problem with any sort of United
Nations action in Syria – Russia and the West simply cannot see eye-to-eye on the nature
of the situation in Syria. The two entities truly hold vastly different concepts of the reality
of the situation, and their respective solutions to the conflict in Syria do not fit with each
other’s understandings of the conflict.
Syria and R2P
The conflict in Syria broke out during the same week when the Security Council
passed Resolution 1973 and the NATO airstrikes began in Libya. The NATO mission in
Libya continued for several months, occurring at the same time as escalating violence in
Syria. From the outset, Russia and China took on a, “fool me once, shame on you; fool
me twice, shame on me” public approach to talk of Security Council action in Syria.
These countries’ abstentions from the vote on Resolution 1973 marked a significant
departure from their traditional foreign policy of non-intervention and diplomatic
resolutions to intrastate conflicts. 293 However, the outcome of the intervention in Libya
seems to have demonstrated to Russia and China that they were right all along – that the
Responsibility to Protect is a Western tool to justify military interventions and sometimes
regime change. 294
The only reference to the notions of Responsibility to Protect occurred after the
double veto by Russia and China blocking the second draft resolution based on the Arab
League resolution when Security Council members expressed their disappointment in the
Council’s failures. Portuguese Representative José Filipe Moraes Cabral said, “Today,
yet again, the Council had failed to meet its responsibilities towards the Syrian people
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and to fulfill its mandate as the primary body responsible for the preservation of peace
and security.” 295 The reference to the Council’s responsibility to the people of Syria is
much closer to the spirit of the Responsibility to Protect than the more common place
statements of governments’ responsibilities to protect their own peoples, but the
aforementioned statement was simply that of an individual representative and was not a
part of any formal document, meaning the R2P was essentially absent from Security
Council considerations regarding Syria.
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V. Comparing Libya and Syria

Thirty-one days passed between the first riot in Benghazi on February 15th and the
first NATO airstrikes against Libyan military targets on March 19th. During those thirtyone days, the United Nations Security Council passed two distinct resolutions dealing
with the human rights abuses in Libya: Resolution 1970 condemning the Libyan
Government’s use of force and imposing sanctions on the government, and Resolution
1973, instituting a no-fly zone over Libya and authorizing Member States to use “all
necessary means” to protect civilians in Libya.
As of April 28th, 2014, it has been three years, one month, and thirteen days since
the first protests occurred in the southern Syrian city of Daraa. The United Nations
Refugee Agency’s official data shows that over 2.7 million296 Syrians have become
refugees since March 2011, and the European Commission estimates that there are
approximately 6.5 million 297 Internally Displaced Persons within Syria as of early April
2014. While the United Nations discontinued its Syria death toll tracker in January 2014
because the numbers could no longer be verified, 298 most current death toll estimates
attribute approximately 150,000 casualties 299 to the civil war between Bashar al-Assad’s
government and a variety of opposition groups. Despite these horrific statistics, the
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United Nations Security Council remains unable to pass any resolutions authorizing
collective action to intervene in Syria.
The question is obvious – what changed? The Security Council acted swiftly and
decisively in the case of Libya, but has been stuck in a three year-long stalemate
regarding Syria. It is essential to understand the differences between the Libyan case and
the Syrian case in order to analyze each situation’s implications for the evolving concept
of sovereignty. This chapter will first outline the concrete differences between the Libyan
and Syrian situations and will then briefly discuss the combined effect of the Libyan and
Syrian conflicts on the Responsibility to Protect as well as the Libyan intervention’s
effect on the international community’s handling of the Syrian Civil War.
Concrete Differences
There are a number of tangible differences between the conflict in Libya and the
ongoing civil war in Syria, and these differences play an important role in understanding
the vastly different international reactions to the two conflicts.
The Libyan and Syrian Governments occupied two very different places in the
international community when violence broke out in each country. Gaddafi was very
isolated – his government did not enjoy particularly close relations with many
governments in general, but especially lacked close allies in the region. 300 Assad, on the
other hand, was well-connected and led a government that was not only perceived as
“strong and stable” by its neighbors, but also played an important role in the region. 301
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Syria also possessed “substantial military resources” 302 and maintained alliances with
such powers as Iran and Russia.
The most significant catalyst for action in Libya was Colonel Gaddafi’s public
statements regarding his people. His use of the word “cockroaches” as well as his blatant
threats to “hunt down” and “extinguish” those who opposed him translated to a
declaration of war on the protesters and the civilian population, which is exactly how the
international community interpreted his statements. 303 Assad, on the other hand, has
maintained a far calmer and more strategic public persona throughout his country’s civil
war. While his government has issued public statements accusing the opposition of being
under the control of foreign influences, terrorists, and “armed gangs,” 304 Assad never
directly threatened his own citizens in a public manner. Throughout the initial months of
violence, the Syrian Government utilized a calculated pattern of repression and violence
combined with regular promises of reform and constitutional changes that essentially
tricked some Syrians into believing that their voices were actually being heard. 305
Once violence broke out in Libya in February 2011, many high-ranking officials
defected from the Gaddafi regime almost immediately, and this large-scale exodus from
the regime sent a powerful message to the international community. 306 Perhaps the most
notable defection was Libya’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalgham, who remained at UN Headquarters and participated
in the Security Council meetings that resulted in the passages of Resolutions 1970 and
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1973. Shalgham accompanied Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to brief the Security
Council on the situation in Libya on February 25th, 2011, when he “compared Gaddafi’s
actions to those of infamous dictators such as Cambodia’s Pol Pot who were willing to
sacrifice large portions of their population for their own glory.” 307 In a statement after the
passage of Resolution 1970 on February 26th, 2011, Shalgham said that the “Council’s
action represented moral support for his people and was a signal that an end must be put
to the fascist regime in Tripoli.” 308 Shalgham’s rapid defection and strong condemnations
of Gaddafi added legitimacy to any Security Council action regarding Libya.
In Syria, on the other hand, defections were scattered and did not occur in the
early days of the conflict like they did in Libya. 309 The first defection by a high-profile
official didn’t occur until July, nearly four months after the beginning of the conflict. 310
While a number of high-ranking members of the Assad government did defect at various
times, their disorganized and sporadic defections did not send a powerful message like
the defections in Libya.
When government officials defected in Libya, they tended to publicly join in the
collective voice speaking against the regime – the Libyan opposition was generally wellorganized and discernible from average citizens. 311 In Syria, however, the opposition has
always been extremely fragmented despite attempts to organize through the formation of
opposition coalitions.312 When Syrian officials defected, they did not all head in the
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direction of a cohesive opposition movement the way Libyan defectors did, so the Syrian
defections simply did not have the same effect on the conflict as a whole. 313
Libya, Syria, and R2P
The conflicts in Libya and Syria have revealed some important lessons about
R2P’s current status in the international community. First, the most significant obstacle
currently standing in the way of further global acceptance of R2P is the “lack of trust in
the aftermath of Libya.” 314 While the intervention in Libya was certainly not an R2Pinstigated intervention in its entirety, the doctrine’s proponents made a conscious effort to
associate R2P with the passages of Resolutions 1970 and 1973, which they perceived as
victories for the concept. However, the “political damage caused by gaps in expectation,
communication, and accountability between those who mandated the operation and those
who executed it” 315 has been a setback to R2P and will take some time to repair. This
setback demonstrated R2P’s fragility despite its initial perceived success, and the
concept’s instability has been further proven by the international community’s failure to
respond forcefully to the civil war in Syria. The Security Council’s stalemate suggests
that “the world has not yet accepted the responsibility to protect as a binding norm of
customary international law.” 316
Finally, the experiences of Libya and Syria have demonstrated the difficulty
inherent in decision-making regarding international intervention. The United Nations has
always maintained that it evaluates situations and conflicts on a case-by-case basis, but
this practice may not be entirely compatible with the concept of the Responsibility to
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Protect. Many international actors and analysts alike have called for the addition of
specific criteria for cases for which the Responsibility to Protect notion can be “invoked,”
and the inconsistency of the responses to Libya and Syria prove the necessity of such
criteria. Currently, a question of intervention is really a question of “adherence to
sovereignty versus prevention of atrocity,” 317 and this is a question for which there is no
“right” answer. However, the establishment of “consistent criteria [to be] applied across
cases, criteria that placed the necessity to protect citizens from genocide and crimes
against humanity at their core,” 318 would alleviate the need to choose between
sovereignty and atrocity prevention on a case-by-case basis. If the Member States of the
United Nations accept a list of quantifiable criteria for intervention for the protection of
civilians, the world could likely avoid another Syria.
Libya as an Explanation for Inaction in Syria
The most obvious and visible cause for the lack of robust Security Council action
in Syria is Security Council members’, and the international community’s, bitter
memories of the intervention in Libya. The mission creep of the Libya intervention
continues to haunt traditionally anti-interventionist countries, and the events that occurred
in Libya have been constantly referenced in both Security Council discussions of Syria
and in outside analyses of the situation. Events in Syria and Libya unfolded more or less
simultaneously, and while it is extremely difficult to compare the two conflicts in 2014,
they seemed fairly similar in early-mid 2011. This perceived similarity likely added fuel
to the fire of anti-interventionist states fearing Syria becoming “another Libya.”
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The international community’s experience with the Libyan intervention, however,
is not enough to explain the gridlock over Syria in the Security Council. The next chapter
will delve into the national interests, geopolitical factors, and other elements of Russia’s
blocking of Syrian resolutions.
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VI. Russian Decision-Making in Syria

Russia’s opposition to external intervention in Syria has remained steadfast over
the last three years despite the conflict’s climbing death toll and the seemingly
exponential growth of refugee populations in neighboring countries. Moscow maintains
that Russia will not permit what happened in Libya to happen in Syria, constantly
echoing fears of a repeated situation of “mission creep.” As the conflict escalated, Russia
became adamant regarding the need for any Security Council action to place equal (if not
more) blame for the violence and bloodshed on the opposition as opposed to targeting the
Assad government. 319 Russia has been able to use this argument as a justification for
vetoing Security Council draft resolutions regarding Syria because the conflict has
evolved into a full-fledged civil war – opposition fighters are heavily armed and have
been reported to use excessive violence on some occasions, and neither side seems to
possess a significant advantage over the other. 320
Throughout the conflict in Syria, Russia has insisted that it was misled regarding
the intervention in Libya and that the West had orchestrated the NATO military
campaign in order to overthrow the Gaddafi government. However, upon close
examination of transcripts from the March 2011 Security Council meetings about Libya,
it is apparent that Russia was not as blindsided as Moscow has claimed over the last three
years. Russia’s public rhetoric throughout the conflict in Syria has been one of antiinterventionism and pro-sovereignty, but it is apparent that Moscow’s blockage of
319
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Security Council action in Syria is about far more than a desire to allow Syria to resolve
its own internal conflict. This chapter will offer a brief background on Russian-Syrian
relations and then analyze Security Council transcripts from March 2011 in order to
prove that Russia was generally not deceived by other Security Council members
regarding the Libya intervention. It will then offer a number of alternative explanations
for Russian actions concerning Syria.
History of Russian-Syrian Relations
While Syria and Russia have not always maintained a close alliance, Russia has
generally seemed content with any sort of regional influence it can exercise in the Middle
East, even if only through Syria. 321 When current Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s
father, Hafez al-Assad, assumed power in 1971, the Syrian Ba’ath regime “emerged as
the USSR’s only steadfast ally among the major states of the Middle East.” 322 On
October 8th, 1980, the two governments signed a treaty of “friendship and
cooperation,” 323 but upon the Soviet Union’s collapse, Syria aligned itself with the
United States and relations between Syria and Russia grew more distant throughout the
1990’s. 324 In 1999, however, Assad visited Moscow and laid the groundwork for a
renewed friendship between the two nations. 325 Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in
2000 and five years later met with Vladimir Putin in Moscow, after which the two
governments announced plans to renew the close relationship of the Soviet-era. 326 This
relationship became especially apparent in the military coordination between the two
321
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countries, with over 10,000 Syrian officers receiving training at Russian military
academies by 2006. 327
When Russian troops intervened on Georgia soil in August 2008, Syria was only
the second country to publicly support Russia in the conflict. 328 Assad visited Moscow
only a few days after the beginning of the hostilities and publicly “rejected attempts to
distort the facts to portray Russia as an aggressor country,” 329 and subsequently offered to
host Russian missile systems on Syrian territory after rumors surfaced of possible
American missile installations in Eastern Europe. 330 Two years later, Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev became the first Russian president to visit Damascus, where he
pledged Russian aid to the development of Syria’s oil and gas infrastructure. 331
Russian Public Position on Syria
Russia has consistently justified its opposition to Security Council action in Syria
by referring to the intervention in Libya. Moscow has tended to portray itself as more or
less tricked into abstaining from the vote on Resolution 1973 concerning the Libyan
intervention, insinuating that the West intended for the intervention to result in regime
change all along. 332 Speaking after vetoing the October 2011 draft resolution, Russian
Representative Vitaly Churkin said, “it is easy to see that today’s ‘Unified Protector’
model [NATO’s Libyan operation] could happen in Syria… these types of models should
be excluded from global practices once and for all.” 333 Since the first veto, Russia has
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sent a blatant message to the international community regarding its intention to block any
resolution that even contains a loophole allowing for external intervention in Syria.
While Moscow continues to cite the development of the Libyan intervention as its
central concern with Security Council action in Syria, it seems unlikely that Russian
leadership was as surprised as they claim when the NATO mission in Libya extended the
definition of “protection of civilians.” This section will analyze the meeting transcripts
from a number of UN Security Council meetings before and during the NATO
intervention in Libya in order to demonstrate that Russia could hardly have been shocked
when NATO forces took on an enhanced role in Libya.
Security Council Meeting #6490, 25 February 2011
On February 25th, 2011, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the Security
Council on the situation in Libya, urging Council members to take swift action and
reminding the Council that “the loss of time means more loss of lives.” 334 The SecretaryGeneral recounted specific allegations of government-perpetrated violence and human
rights abuses, and pointed out that the UN Human Rights Council’s decision to convene a
special session on Libya earlier the same day marked the first meeting of its kind about
one of its members. 335
He was joined by defected Libyan Representative Abdurrahman Mohamed
Shalgham, who “called upon the embattled leader [Gaddafi] to leave the Libyan people in
peace and expressed his country’s determination to be free,” 336 and asked the United
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Nations to, “Please… save Libya.” 337 Shalgham’s defection in and of itself demonstrates
his position regarding the Gaddafi regime’s future in Libya, but his call to the Security
Council also contained undertones of regime change.
Security Council Meeting #6491, 26 February 2011
A day later, the Security Council reconvened and unanimously adopted
Resolution 1970 on Libya. The Secretary-General called the vote a “vital step,” but
reminded Council members that the actions of Resolution 1970 did not present a full
solution to the conflict, warning of the possibility for the need of “bolder steps.” 338
Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalgham took his insinuations of regime change a step further,
remarking that the resolution’s passage “was a signal that an end must be put to the
fascist regime in Tripoli.” 339
Security Council Meeting #6498, 17 March 2011
On March 17th, the Security Council approved Resolution 1973, which not only
instituted a no-fly zone over Libya but also authorized UN Member States to take “all
necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians. Ten Council members voted in favor of
the resolution, while Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia abstained. A number of
representatives spoke after the vote, and many referenced that the Gaddafi regime’s time
was over, despite the language of the resolution including nothing about regime change.
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French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé said that the “will of the Libyan people had
been trampled under the feet of the Gaddafi regime,” 340 pointing out that the Libyan
Government had ignored Resolution 1970 and that there had actually been an increase in
violence against civilians since its passage. 341 Juppé acknowledged the positions of
regional organizations, referencing the Arab League’s March 12th call for a no-fly zone
over Libya as well as the African Union’s call for an end to violence against civilians in
Libya. 342
Lebanese Representative Newaf Salam said that “the Libyan authorities had lost
all their legitimacy.” 343 British Representative Mark Lyall Grant immediately echoed the
statement, describing the Gaddafi government as a “violent, discredited regime that has
lost all legitimacy [and] using weapons of war against civilians.” 344 He described the
purpose of the resolution as “to end the violence, to protect civilians, and to allow the
people of Libya to determine their own future, free from the tyranny of the Al-Gaddafi
regime.” 345 The last element of this statement carries definite connotations of political
transition or regime change, despite the resolution’s lack of explicit mention of this goal.
While Germany abstained from voting due to concerns about the possibility of a
prolonged military effort on the ground, German Representative Peter Wittig noted that
the Gaddafi regime’s “time is over” and had “lost all legitimacy and can no longer be an
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interlocutor for us.” 346 He spoke of the need to “promote political transition” in Libya,
specifically calling for measures that would end Gaddafi’s rule. 347
Colombia’s Néstor Osorio spoke of a “regime that has lost all legitimacy” 348 and
pointed out that the Libyan Government had “shown that it was not up to protecting and
promoting the rights of its people.” 349 Moraes Cabral of Portugal said that “the regime
that has ruled Libya for more than 40 years has come to an end by the will of the Libyan
people.” 350
While Resolution 1973 did not contain language explicitly outlining an objective
of political transition, the statements of many Security Council members shared a
connotation of a goal of political transition in Libya. The repeated comments regarding
the Gaddafi regime’s loss of legitimacy certainly seem to beg the question of whether
Libyan civilians could actually be protected so long as the “illegitimate” Gaddafi regime
remained in Tripoli.
Russian Representative Vitaly Churkin brought up concerns that “work on the
resolution was not in keeping with Security Council practice, with many questions having
remained unanswered, including how it [the no-fly zone] would be enforced and by
whom, and what the limits of engagement would be.” 351 Despite these relatively
significant concerns, Churkin abstained rather than vetoing. He went on to say that “we
[Russia] are consistent and firm advocates of the protection of the civilian population.
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Guided by this basic principle as well as by the common humanitarian values that we
share with both the sponsors and other Council members, Russia did not prevent the
adoption of this resolution.” 352 Russia made it clear in subsequent statements that it chose
not to block the resolution in light of the Arab League’s request for the no-fly zone.
Churkin’s concerns reflect a significant level of skepticism regarding the resolution, yet
he did not block its passage.
Security Council Meeting #6509, 4 April 2011
Approximately two weeks after the initial Security Council-approved airstrikes,
the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Libya, Abdul Ilah al-Khatib, updated the
Security Council on the conflict and the intervention. Al-Khatib reported on his separate
meetings with both Libyan Government officials and members of the interim Transitional
National Council, indicating that the Transitional National Council was willing to
implement a ceasefire, but that media reports had surfaced suggesting that the
government had rejected the plan. 353 The Transitional National Council had presented alKhatib with a “vision of a democratic Libya” and pledged to work closely with the
Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry. 354 The meeting concluded with an
update on the fighting itself – al-Khatib reported that while the NATO efforts to enforce a
no-fly zone had been effective, fighting had moved to the ground with clashes between
Gaddafi loyalists and opposition forces. 355 He also mentioned unconfirmed reports of
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government forces shelling towns near Tripoli, 356 nearly four hundred miles of Benghazi,
where the majority of the violence against civilians had previously occurred.
Security Council Meeting #6528, 4 May 2011
After another month, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
reported to the Security Council regarding Resolution 1970’s referral of the situation in
Libya to the Court. Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo announced his plan to seek
arrest warrants against three Libyan officials who “appeared to bear the greatest criminal
responsibility” 357 for crimes against humanity in Libya. He recounted evidence of
“shooting peaceful demonstrators, as well as ongoing violent repression and systematic
persecutions, together with murder, imprisonment, rape, and torture.... civilians had been
used as human shields and targeted with heavy weapons and cluster munitions… Libyan
forces had blocked delivery of humanitarian supplies.” 358 Moreno-Ocampo noted that
there had been blatant efforts made to cover up the crimes, which included doctors being
prohibited from documenting details or numbers of patients. 359 The Chief Prosecutor
assured the Council members that each case he planned to present to the Court involved
victims who were unarmed civilians shot by security forces with no evidence of
provocation. 360 While no mention was made of the identities of the three officials,
Moreno-Ocampo said that their arrests would “deter ongoing crimes, remove those who
had ordered them, and send a serious message to other potential perpetrators.” 361
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Speaking after Moreno-Ocampo’s presentation, German Representative Peter
Wittig stated that “the Gaddafi regime had lost its legitimacy and a new government
would work to open Libya to democracy, which would require national reconciliation and
clarity about the injustices committed.” 362 This marked the first explicit reference to a
new Libyan Government in the Security Council meetings on the conflict. United States
Representative Susan Rice described increasing reports of widespread attacks by Libyan
Government forces as further proof of Gaddafi’s loss of “any and all legitimacy to lead
Libya.” 363
Analysis
In its March 12th appeal to the United Nations Security Council, the Arab League
“urged the Security Council to set in place measures to protect the civilian population
from widespread human rights abuses and declared that the existing Libyan authorities
had lost all legitimacy.” 364 The Arab League’s assessment of the Gaddafi regime’s loss of
legitimacy clearly influenced the Security Council’s actions, as is evident both in the
rapid passage of Resolution 1973 and Council members’ statements regarding the
resolution.
When Russia (and four other countries) abstained from voting on Resolution
1973, they each acknowledged that the regional organizations’ requests to the Security
Council. Russia, in particular, noted significant concerns about the resolution, but
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attributed its choice to not veto the measure to its belief in protecting the civilian
population. 365
Historically, Russia has brought up the positions of regional organizations as
justification for blocking measures. For instance, in 2008, Russia vetoed a draft
resolution that sought to institute an arms embargo in response to the increasing violence
and humanitarian violations in Zimbabwe surrounding the country’s unstable elections. 366
Explaining its veto, Russia pointed out that the resolution was against the wishes of
regional organizations, stating that “the sponsors of the draft resolution have not
considered the opinions of the States of the region… the draft ignores the consensual
decision of the African Union appealing to States to refrain from any act that could have
a negative impact on advancing the dialogue between Zimbabwean parties.” 367 Along
with a handful of other similar situations, the case of Russia’s veto based on regional
organizations in 2008 seems to demonstrate Moscow’s consistent respect for the value of
regional organizations’ wishes. This is the basis for the “rhetorical entrapment”
explanation used to describe Russia’s abstention from voting on Resolution 1973 – the
concept that Russia had previously demonstrated a high level of respect for regional
organizations and therefore could not blatantly act against the wishes of the Arab League
and the African Union, among others, in the case of Libya. 368
While the rhetorical entrapment argument is convincing in the case of Libya, the
subsequent situation in Syria has disproven the theory. Russia has continually vetoed UN
Security Council efforts in Syria despite strong, repeated calls from the Arab League and
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other regional organizations for Security Council action. In the case of Libya, Russia
prioritized regional legitimacy and consent over state sovereignty, but Moscow has
proven itself “loath to endorse any measure that might form a basis for the replacement of
Assad’s regime,” 369 despite the Arab League’s criticism of Assad and suspension of
Syria. This contradiction between Russia’s actions in Libya and Syria suggests that
Russia may not actually value regional consent but rather is willing to acquiesce to
regional opinion in situations that do not affect Moscow’s own interests (the next section
will explain these interests in the case of Syria).
Russia became vocally critical of the intervention within days of its initial
airstrikes, almost immediately protesting the perceived shift in focus to regime change. 370
However, it is unlikely that this shift came as the surprise Russia claimed it to be.
Discussing the effect of the Libyan intervention on the situation in Syria, UN-based
journalist Ian Williams writes,
It is true that the West bypassed both the formal and the diplomatic niceties of
consulting other UN members over the course of the [Libya] intervention, but
[current Russian Foreign Minister] Sergei Lavrov was Moscow’s permanent
representative at the UN when the US was abusing resolutions against Iraq, so
unless he had a very conveniently short memory, he does not have too many
excuses for not foreseeing the outcome. 371
Veteran Russian leaders are hardly naïve or easily fooled – they were present for all of
the Security Council meetings in which countless Council members referenced the
Gaddafi regime’s “loss of legitimacy” or the need for a new Libyan Government. Even
Russian President Medvedev began acknowledging the regime’s failures, joining with his
fellow G8 leaders at the G8 summit in May in an unanimous agreement that Gaddafi’s
369
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regime had “lost legitimacy and he [Gaddafi] must leave.” 372 Despite this admittance,
however, the Russian Government’s criticism of the intervention continued to increase as
the conflict raged on in Libya.
Moscow took particular issue with the NATO coalition (and therefore the United
Nations) siding with one side of the conflict, an action that Foreign Minister Lavrov
insisted violated the UN Charter. 373 However, Resolution 1973, which Russia chose to
abstain from voting on, explicitly condemned the violations of human rights and the acts
of violence against journalists committed by Libyan authorities. 374 The resolution itself
expressed the Security Council’s position countering the Libyan Government, which
suggested that any intervention would do the same.
Russia’s government is not naïve, nor is it easily surprised, but Moscow certainly
played the role of an anti-interventionist state tricked into allowing the passage of
Resolution 1973 by the Western powers intent on regime change. There were many
signals, albeit sometimes subtle, during Security Council meetings leading up to the
NATO intervention that pointed to the desire for a new Libyan Government at the
conclusion of the intervention. While Russia continually claims that its actions regarding
Syria are motivated by a desire to avoid “another Libya” and an insistence on the
international community’s acknowledgement of the shared culpability of the Syrian
Government and the opposition forces, there is far more to Moscow’s position in the
Syrian crisis. The following section will discuss a number of alternative explanations for
Russia’s position on Syria.
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Alternative Explanations
Political Payback
The first, and perhaps most cynical, alternative is that of political payback, which
suggests that the intervention in Libya did play a central role in the blockage of Syriarelated resolutions, but for reasons different from those publicly stated by Russia (and
China). 375 While these countries publicly expressed a “fear of using the Responsibility to
Protect as a pretext for regime change,” 376 they actually viewed vetoing the Syria
resolutions as an ideal opportunity for political payback.
This theory requires a slightly different assumption regarding Russia’s decision to
abstain from voting on Resolution 1973. Prior to the resolution’s passage, a number of
NATO powers expressed that they would consider taking action in Libya regardless of
the Security Council’s vote, 377 and Russia and China chose not to block the “legal stamp
on a military intervention that would have occurred either way.” 378 In abstaining, Russia
risked a number of economic interests tied to the Gaddafi regime that, while not
substantial in the grand scheme of the Russian economy, still represented a sacrifice from
Moscow. The political payback theory suggests that Russia “gambled on Western
miscalculation that would benefit or at least not harm its interests,” 379 but when the
Gaddafi regime fell, Russia lost $10 billion worth of military arms, railroads, and oil
contracts. 380 When the operation ran “smoothly and cost-effective,” 381Russia gained
nothing in the new era of Libyan politics. Shortly after the fall of the Gaddafi regime,
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when multinational corporations and governments alike rushed to access Libya’s oil
reserves, the largest in Africa, Libyan oil company AGOCO told the media that the
company “[did not] have a problem with western countries like Italians, French, and UK
companies. But we may have some political issues with Russia, China, and Brazil.” 382
This not only represented a major setback for Russian economic interests, but also meant
that Russia had risked its own interests in Libya and left the intervention empty handed.
The political payback theory suggests that Russia felt as though it countered its
very public anti-intervention stance for nothing in return in Libya. 383 A very wary Russia
saw an opportunity to get back at those states advocating swift action in Syria, even
though neither major draft resolution on Syria would have approved any sort of external
intervention. The implications of this theory vary, but perhaps most striking is what this
explanation says about Russia’s position on state sovereignty.
Russia has repeatedly posited a very strict interpretation of state sovereignty,
generally speaking strongly against outside intervention in a sovereign nation’s internal
affairs. 384 Russian diplomats constantly raise the country’s concern for respecting the
sovereignty of nations in turmoil, and this trend continued during Security Council
meetings surrounding both the Libya conflict and the Syrian Civil War. The foreign
policy of Putin-era Russia has clearly focused on state sovereignty and the maintenance
of the status quo in the international system, 385 but the political payback theory seems to
suggest that this position on sovereignty is less rigid that Russia has made it seem. This
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interpretation of Russia’s choices regarding Libya and Syria demonstrates that Russia is
very much willing to make exceptions regarding its position on sovereignty. In the case
of Libya, Russia’s traditional emphasis on sovereignty was hardly steadfast – based on
the political payback theory’s interpretation of the abstention on Resolution 1973,
Russia’s motivations remained focused on Moscow’s own political calculations. While
this interpretation provides no explicit alternative to the concept of Russia as a champion
of traditional state sovereignty, it certainly demonstrates that Russia’s commitment to
respecting the sovereignty of other states is not universal.
Economic Interests
Russia’s economic interests in Syria are not substantial enough to serve as a
stand-alone explanation for Russian actions surrounding the conflict in Syria, but it can
certainly be assumed that these interests have played some role. The primary focus of
discussions surrounding Russia’s economic interests in Syria is always Russian arms
sales to the Syrian Government. When Russia vetoed the October 2011 draft resolution
regarding Syria, American Representative Susan Rice made a passionate statement,
referring to the Russians as “those who would rather sell arms to the Syrian regime than
stand with the Syrian people.” 386 However, the Russian-Syrian arms trade is “not
substantial enough to offer a credible explanation for the Russian stance in the Syrian
crisis.” 387 While Russian-supplied rams accounted for 72 percent of Syria’s arms imports
between 2007 and 2011, the same trade only accounted for 5 percent of Russia’s arms
exports during the same time span. 388 Not only does Syria represent only a very small
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portion of Russian arms exports, but the Assad government is very behind on payments
for these arms – as of February 2012, Syria had reportedly only paid for less than half of
what it owed for the arms it had contracted from Russia and there has been no clear
indication that the Assad government can afford to complete the payments anytime
soon. 389 While the future arms contracts in Syria worth $4 billion certainly represent a
substantial sum for some Russian companies, 390
The other major Russian economic interest in Syria is the energy industry, with
many Russian companies engaging in oil exploration and extraction (though Syria’s oil
supply is limited compared to its neighbors), 391 natural gas processing and petroleum
processing. The Russian government has also made plans to build an extension of the
Arab Gas Pipeline through Syria that would ultimately connect Egyptian natural gas as
far north as Turkey. 392
Estimates vary as to the total value of Russian investments in Syria, but in 2009
the Moscow Times reported total investments equaling around $19.4 billion. 393 While
that amount is likely higher due to ongoing projects and investments, it still demonstrates
that Syria is not of vital economic interest to Russia, whose trade with Syria totaled less
than its trade with either Tunisia or Estonia in 2011. 394 After experiencing economic
repercussions after the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, Russia is wary of the potential
consequences of regime change in Syria. A new Syrian Government based on the current
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opposition movement would likely hold less-than-favorable views of Russia due to
Moscow’s support for Assad and might act on these views by weakening its economic
ties with Russia and instead focusing more on relations with Western powers. While
economic relations with Syria do not account for a large portion of the Russian economy,
the loss of Russian contracts in Syria would negatively affect many Russian companies,
especially those with energy investments in Syria, and the Russian Government would
naturally wish to avoid such a problem. It is therefore in Russia’s economic interests to
retain the status quo in Damascus and in doing so preserve its economic ties with Syria.
Geopolitical/Strategic Interests
While economic interests likely play only a small role in Russian decision-making
regarding Syria, geopolitical/strategic interests represent a significant consideration for
Moscow. While these interests are generally broad and intangible, one cannot ignore the
Russian naval facility located in the Syrian port city of Tartus. The Tartus facility is fairly
small and “exists as little more than three floating piers (only one of which is in service),
a repair vessel on loan from the Black Sea fleet, warehouses, and barracks to house some
50 personnel.” 395 In June 2013, Russia’s Defense Ministry removed military personnel
from the facility, leaving only civilian workers in Tartus. 396 It is obvious that the small
facility in Syria is not of great tactical significance, but it does play an important strategic
role – as Russia’s only military base outside of the former Soviet Union, 397 it serves as a
symbol of Russian “geopolitical influence and geostrategic reach.” 398 Even a limited
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Russian presence in the Middle East is Moscow’s way of reminding the region and the
world that its influence reaches beyond the former Soviet Union.
However, Russian strategic interests extend beyond the symbolism of the Tartus
naval facility. Moscow’s unwavering support for Assad could very well be intended to
send a message to other governments, particularly those that are not already closely
aligned with the West, that Russia is a reliable, strong ally. 399 By standing by Assad,
Russia demonstrates that it is a “more trustworthy ally than Western leaders, who are
known for shaking hands with dictators only to let them fall over human rights or
democracy-related concerns at the next occasion.” 400 Russia’s insistence that the Security
Council place equal blame for the bloodshed in Syria on the Syrian opposition sends a
powerful message to governments throughout the world that an alliance with Russia
ensures protection in the international system.
Russia’s support for the Syrian Government also represents the important Russian
geopolitical goal of influence in the Middle East. Moscow’s relationship with Damascus
is stronger than with any other Middle Eastern government, and Russia seems to believe
that the fall of Assad would also mean the fall of Russian influence in the region. 401
Russia has repeatedly called for a political solution to the conflict in Syria – in a
December 2013 interview, Russian Special Representative for the Middle East Settlement
and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov perfectly summarized the Russian
position in insisting that the Syrian crisis “has no military solution as there is no
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alternative to a political settlement.” 402 As a vocal supporter of a non-interventionist,
political solution, Russia is setting itself up to be involved in such a solution. In doing so,
Russia may hope to “enshrine continued Russian influence in the region as a whole,” 403
ensuring its geopolitical reach with or without Assad.
Russian Fear/Paranoia
Perhaps the least obvious explanation for Russian actions surrounding Syria is
that of the Russian Government’s paranoia concerning its own status within its borders.
This paranoia is not limited to the Syrian conflict, as Russia’s continued commitment to
preserving the status quo in the international system can be “partly explained by its own
domestic system and the internal threats they [the Russian Government] are facing
themselves.” 404 However, there are several elements of the civil war in Syria that may
have contributed to a heightened concern on the part of Moscow regarding possible
domestic effects.
Russian statements calling for an absolute respect for state sovereignty are not
new, nor are they simply a reflection of engrained political values. After Russia and
China blocked the February 2012 draft resolution on Syria, a spokesman for Russian
President Putin issued a public statement on Putin’s behalf. The statement read, “Russia
is strictly against a situation when a group of countries can play the role of a global judge,
judging whose leader is legal and whose is non-legal, and the Russians were deeply
worried over the possibility of having the Security Council decide to get rid of wanted or
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unwanted leaders.” 405 A year later, the Russian Foreign Ministry published its foreign
policy concept, which strongly condemned “ideas aimed at overthrowing legitimate
authorities in sovereign states under the pretext of protecting the civilian population.” 406
Russia portrays itself as a defender of state sovereignty, but some of this rhetoric is
rooted in a place of fear for the Russian Government’s own legitimacy. Top Russian
leaders are aware of “challenges to central political control” 407 within Russia and fear the
effects that the UN-sanctioned overthrow of an authoritarian regime could have on those
domestic challenges. 408
After a meeting with British officials in London in February 2011, Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told a group of reporters that “calls for revolutions are
counterproductive… we believe we don’t need to impose revolutions on others.” 409 This
statement seemed out of place at the time, especially because the first Security Council
meeting regarding Libya did not occur until nine days after Lavrov’s visit to London. A
day before the first Security Council meeting, then-President Medvedev told the Russian
National Counterterrorism Committee that “the scenario unfolding in the Arab States
ha[s] been prepared for Russia too by certain script-writers… but the organization of the
Middle East scenario in Russia will fail.” 410 These statements, delivered with a defensive
undertone, seem to reflect a Russian fear of revolution and regime change in Libya. One
explanation for this preemptive fear cites the February 2011 ousting of Hosni Mubarak in
Egypt as the catalyst for heightened concern in Moscow. In observing the Egyptian
405
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revolution and subsequently the Syrian conflict, Russian leadership witnessed firsthand
the consequences of a “highly personalized political system characterized by a strong
centralization of real political power.” 411
Moscow’s fears were not a matter of simply paranoia. A poll conducted by the
independent Levada Centre during the first weeks of the Syrian conflict showed that “38
percent of Russians think the so-called ‘Egypt scenario’ possible in Russia,” 412 while a
simultaneous Public Opinion Foundation survey revealed that a striking 49 percent of
Russians “[were] prepared to participate in protest demonstrations.” 413 Members of
Russian opposition parties have also played a role in fanning the flames of the Kremlin’s
paranoia by publicly pointing out a “lack of electoral legitimacy” as a common trait
between Russia and the Middle Eastern nations experiencing uprisings. 414 Russia’s
relatively steadfast stance in Syria serves many purposes, not least of which is as a
reminder to the Russian people of the strength of Putin’s government. By blocking yet
another Western-led regime change, the Kremlin believes it can reign in challenges to its
own legitimacy and prevent opposition elements within Russia from feeling as though the
international community supports the overthrow of authoritarian regimes as a rule. 415
One of Russia’s main concerns regarding Syria is the potential for the spread of
sectarian warfare throughout the region. 416 In a June 2012 interview, Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov warned that “inter-ethnic/inter-religious strife could rapidly spill over to
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embrace the entire region,” 417 highlighting one of Russia’s central problems with the
Syrian opposition. As the Syrian conflict has developed, Moscow has voiced increasing
concern regarding religious radicals within the fragmented Syrian opposition. While
these concerns are certainly valid in the context of a potential new Syrian Government
borne of the current opposition, Russia’s concerns derive from the Kremlin’s own
security concerns.
Russia’s warnings regarding regional spillover do not just apply to Syria’s
immediate neighbors, but also to surrounding regions, particularly the North Caucasus, an
embattled region that is legally part of the Russian Federation but is more or less
occupied by a de facto separatist militia. While Putin publicly asserts that Moscow is in
full control of the North Caucasus, the region has actually become less stable in recent
years and remains a significant security concern for Russia. 418 The most contentious part
of the North Caucasus is Chechnya, a self-declared republic that acquired de facto
independence from Russia in 1996 but was reclaimed by Russia in 2000. 419 The Russian
military spent the next nine years reasserting civil control in Chechnya despite significant
and violent challenges from the remaining separatist movement. 420 The Chechen
separatists were predominately Sunni Muslims, and Syria’s Alawite (Shia) regime has
always supported Moscow’s efforts in the North Caucasus. 421 Should the Assad regime
be overthrown by Sunni opposition forces, the new government would likely take a
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different stance regarding the North Caucasus, a change in policy that the Kremlin would
like to avoid. 422
The conflict in Syria is not entirely based in sectarian differences, but there is a
sizeable portion of the opposition that identifies with radical Sunnism and has taken up
arms against the Alawite Assad regime. 423 While as of 2013 there were not significant
numbers of Chechen fighters in Syria, there has been some evidence of Chechens slowly
arriving in Syria from other countries in the Middle East in order to fight alongside the
Sunni opposition.424
Despite Moscow’s completed claims that Chechnya and the rest of the North
Caucasus are stable and fully under Russian control, Russian leaders’ fears of Chechen
fighters are still evident. Shortly after two ethnic Chechens perpetrated the Boston
Marathon bombings in April 2013, a member of the Russian foreign ministry
International Law Council warned that “Chechens fighting in Syria on the side of the
insurgents, suggested most implausibly to number between 600 and 6,000, and described
as carrying out terrorist acts in Syria, might in the future turn their hand to completely
different countries.” 425 This statement, riding on the tails of a terrorist attack conducted
by Chechens in the United States, demonstrated Russia’s anxiety regarding Chechen
rebel forces and reflected the Russian leadership’s fear of “opposition reciprocity.”
Russian leaders have expressed concerns that “Islamist [Sunni] opposition groups in
Syria, given sustenance by western states’ policy towards the Assad regime, might… feed
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back to Russia’s North Caucasus,” 426 but they have also sought to imply that these groups
will not stop in the North Caucasus and will eventually pose a threat to Western
Europe. 427
A victory for the Syrian opposition and a new Sunni government in the country
would not bode well for Russian interests – Moscow would take an economic hit as the
new government distances itself from the Kremlin, lose the patch of influence it so
desperately seeks in the Middle East, and risk a spillover of sectarian violence as Sunni
Islamist fighters shift their focus elsewhere. Russia sees the sectarian element of the
conflict in Syria as a “microcosm of a wider challenge,” 428 viewing the overthrow of the
Alawite Assad government and the ascension of a new Sunni government as a move in
the direction of a complete Sunni domination of the region. 429 Russia has not generally
enjoyed strong relations with Sunni states, 430 and the Kremlin’s own struggles against
Sunni militants in Chechnya has inclined Russian leadership to favor Shiia governments
in the Middle East. Russian actions surrounding the conflict in Syria cannot be explained
by Moscow’s commitment to a strict definition of state sovereignty or by the results of
the Libya intervention. Instead, the Russian position on Syria is based on Russia’s desire
to protect its economic and strategic interests in the country, as well as its own concerns
about the future stability of its central political control and the challenges posed by Sunni
fighters in the North Caucuses.
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VII. Conclusion

The drastically different international responses to the conflict in Libya and the
ongoing civil war in Syria demonstrate that the international community is still grappling
with the “legal, political, and moral” 431 standards for humanitarian intervention in
intrastate conflicts. While the humanitarian crises of the last several decades have been
characterized by inconsistencies in international responses, the discussion surrounding
these crises points to a distinct departure from the Westphalian interpretation of state
sovereignty and a shift to an understanding of the limitations of the traditional system of
sovereignty. Russia has vocally resisted this trend, but its reactions to the intervention in
Libya and subsequent actions surrounding the ongoing conflict in Syria tell a story of
Russia’s true motivations surrounding the two events, and demonstrate that even the
Russians, who paint themselves as great defenders of traditional sovereignty, recognize
that the strict Westphalian definition is a thing of the past.
The UN Security Council-sanctioned intervention in Libya has been subjected to
significant criticism, but nevertheless demonstrated the international community’s shift
away from the traditional definition of sovereignty. As the previous chapter points out,
several Security Council members spoke of the Gaddafi regime’s loss of legitimacy
during Security Council meetings surrounding Resolutions 1970 and 1973. This loss of
legitimacy, resulting from the Libyan Government’s violence against its citizens,
demonstrates, at least on some level, the acceptance of the association between
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legitimacy, and therefore sovereignty, and respect for human rights. 432 This relationship
is at the core of the social contract-style sovereignty of the Responsibility to Protect, 433
and while R2P itself did not play a central role in the intervention in Libya, the
acknowledgement of the association between sovereignty and human rights in the case of
Libya demonstrates the international community’s departure from strict Westphalian
sovereignty.
Unlike the rapid progression of the intervention in Libya, robust international
response to the civil war in Syria has been almost nonexistent. After over three years of
violence, more than 150,000 casualties, 434 and over 2.6 million registered Syria
refugees, 435 the Security Council has only managed to pass three resolutions concerning
Syria – the first authorized an observer mission that lasted for less than a week, the
second required the Syrian Government to give up its chemical weapons stockpile, and
the third demanded that “all parties allow delivery of humanitarian assistance” 436 in
Syria. While the differences in the Security Council’s responses to the two conflicts can
be largely explained by examining Russia’s interests and actions in the two situations, the
inconsistency of the international community’s reactions demonstrated one of the greatest
challenges for humanitarian interventionism and the Responsibility to Protect in
particular.
When the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
released its Responsibility to Protect report in 2001, it included criteria for determining
432
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whether a situation requires international involvement as well as a set of six principles
that must be met to justify external military intervention in an intrastate conflict. 437
However, the World Summit Outcome Document on R2P that was unanimously adopted
in 2005 made no mention of these provisions. While R2P advocates, including UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, have pushed for concrete standards like those in the
original ICISS Report, the drastically different reactions to Libya and Syria have
reinforced the need for objective criteria for all three pillars of R2P. 438
In November 2011, Brazil, one of the five countries that abstained from the vote
on Resolution 1973, submitted a document to the General Assembly entitled
“Responsibility While Protecting.” As a vocal skeptic of infringements on traditional
sovereignty and external intervention in states’ domestic affairs, Brazil stressed
“accountability, assessment, and prevention” 439 in what can be best described as a
supplement to the 2005 World Summit document on the Responsibility to Protect. 440 The
proposal advocates an increase in active prevention in line with the first pillar of the
Responsibility to Protect and seeks to institute a set of objective criteria for military
intervention. 441 The Brazilian proposal for this set of criteria included language either
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reminiscent of or identical to the language of the original ICISS Report, such as
requirements of proportionality and balance of consequences. 442
The Responsibility While Protecting proposal also suggested “enhanced Security
Council procedures… to monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are
interpreted and implemented.” 443 This element of the Brazilian proposal, a clear reaction
to the criticisms of mission creep in the Libyan intervention, would “ensure that it [the
Security Council] has a reasonable chance to maintain consensus throughout the duration
of an implementation operation.” 444 The proposal has not been pushed past the
introductory stages in the General Assembly, but has still managed to draw significant
(and polarized) attention. Opponents of the Brazilian proposal, most of whom are also
supporters of R2P, see the proposal as a “deliberate ploy by states aligned with China and
Russia to impede intervention.” 445
While the Responsibility While Protecting document is largely a reaction to
criticisms of the Libyan intervention’s shift in focus from civilian protection to regime
change, some see the two focuses as linked, questioning whether civilians can be truly
protected so long as the regime they need protection from remains in power. 446 This
argument suggests that there is no clear line between civilian protection and regime
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change, 447 as the “Security Council is in no position to make minute by minute, strategic
military decisions,” 448 even with the hypothetical implementation of the monitoring
element of the Responsibility While Protecting proposal. While regime change should
never be the objective of a consensus-based intervention, there may be cases, like that of
Libya, when it becomes evident to those executing the intervention that regime change is
the “only viable strategy to prevent the commission of governmental atrocities.” 449 This
side of the debate brings up an additional difficulty in the R2P principle, as it suggests
that a Security Council resolution may not always be able to anticipate what the
“minimum force required to achieve… the core objective of the protection of the civilian
population from genocide, crimes against humanity, and other gross human rights
abuses.” 450 However, the Libyan intervention demonstrated that the international
community, and especially Russia, China, and other states that tend to object to violations
of traditional sovereignty, is far from willing to allow “conditions on the ground [to]
trump all other considerations.” 451
These developments in the conversation surrounding R2P since the intervention in
Libya show that while there is still no global consensus regarding the role or
implementation of R2P, 452 the international community as a whole has accepted the shift
away from Westphalian sovereignty. However, a number of countries, largely led by
Russia, have continued to publicly affirm their commitments to the strict interpretation of
traditional sovereignty. Russia consistently raises concerns regarding respect for state
447
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sovereignty in Security Council meetings regarding intrastate conflicts, and Russian
President Vladimir Putin especially places significant emphasis on respect for state
sovereignty. 453
This thesis argued that Russian statements regarding concern for state sovereignty
and the Russian public position regarding Syria do not represent the true motivations
behind Russia’s decision-making throughout the Syrian Civil War, and that these true
motivations demonstrate that contrary to their public fixation with a traditional
interpretation of sovereignty, the Russians recognize that strict Westphalian sovereignty
is a thing of the past. While these motivations include the traditional justifications of
economic and strategic interests, the final piece of the puzzle is Moscow’s concerns
regarding its own stability and longevity.
An examination of the transcripts from the Security Council meetings surrounding
the Libyan intervention shows that Russia was not the victim of an underhanded
deception by the West regarding the goals of the intervention. Instead, it seems as if
Russia’s vocal indignation regarding the intervention in Libya was extremely calculated –
the Russian leadership is not naïve, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in
particular, is well-versed in the “wheeling and dealing” 454 of the United Nations after
serving as the Russian Representative to the UN for a decade prior to assuming his
current office. 455 The constant refrains of the Gaddafi regime’s loss of legitimacy during
the Security Council meetings prior to the passage of Resolution 1973 seem to send a
rather blatant message, and it is unlikely that top Russian officials were really as
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surprised as they claimed after the NATO intervention expanded its operations in
Libya. 456 In reality, it seems, Russia has taken advantage of the fortuitous shift of focus in
Libya in order to warn the rest of the world of the West’s crusade of regime change,
particularly in authoritarian states. 457 Given the Russian Government’s awareness of
domestic challenges to its centralized authority, 458 Russia’s constant and repetitive
statements about respecting sovereignty and “legitimate” governments certainly seem to
be intended much more for its own benefit than it is intended to defend Assad. By
objecting to intervention in Syria, Russia is able to actively protect its own sovereignty.
Putin “identifies with Assad, former Libyan president Moammar Gaddafi, and former
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak,” 459 and he fears a continuing trend of Western
democracies leading UN-sanctioned interventions in non-democratic nations that result in
regime change.
Moscow witnessed what happened when a population rose up against a
government with a “highly personalized political system characterized by a strong
centralization of real political power” 460 in Egypt. The Syrian conflict has presented the
Russian Government with an opportunity to prevent the overthrow of an authoritarian
regime, thereby simultaneously protecting Russia’s own interests in Syria and depriving
potential opposition movements within Russia of an additional example of Westernbacked regime change.
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Despite its continued public position regarding a strict interpretation of state
sovereignty, Russia is well aware of the departure from this traditional interpretation that
has occurred over the last several decades. As the United Nations demonstrated a
growing concern for violent intrastate conflicts throughout the 1990’s, it became
increasingly clear that humanitarian crises contained within individual states presented
the international community with a moral dilemma – strict respect for state sovereignty
versus external intervention to end human rights violations within sovereign territory. 461
As the world witnessed gross human rights violations and significant bloodshed in
Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the international community “increasingly
accepted that governments ought to be answerable for the treatment of their
populations.” 462 With the advent of the Responsibility to Protect, it became clear that this
notion of limitations to traditional sovereignty represented a shift in the general
interpretation of sovereignty.
Russia demonstrated its awareness of this new development in the concept of
sovereignty after its 2008 war against Georgia when, in a thinly-veiled attempt to justify
its movement into Georgia, Moscow claimed that its invasion intended to stop a genocide
and protect Russian citizens there. 463 The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission
on the Conflict in Georgia revealed that these “Russian citizens” were separatists in the
Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia who had received military training
and Russian passports from the Russian Government in the years leading up to the
461
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August 2008 conflict. 464 Russian claims of civilian death tolls in the thousands from
Georgia attacks were also refuted by local doctors, who placed the death toll in the
dozens. 465
The ongoing conflict spurred by Ukraine’s position at a crossroads between
alignment with Russia or closer ties with the European Union provides robust evidence of
Russia’s recognition of the limitations on state sovereignty that have evolved over the last
several decades. After several months of protests in Ukraine marked by violent clashes
between pro-European Union protesters and government forces, the Russian Parliament
approved President Putin’s request for authorization to use Russian military forces in
Ukraine to “protect Russian interests.” 466 As Russian troops moved into Crimea, Putin
claimed that the action was at the request of ousted Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovich, who Russia still recognized as the legitimate leader of the country as he was
“not properly removed from power in a formal impeachment.” 467 Speaking from outside
Moscow, Putin explained, “we have received a request from a legitimate president. Also
we have historical and cultural ties with those people [Russian-speakers in Crimea]. And
this is a humanitarian mission.” 468 This attempt to portray Russian invasion of Crimea as
a “humanitarian mission” was not taken particularly seriously by the international
community, but it did further demonstrate Russia’s recognition of the humanitarian
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limitation to state sovereignty. Rather ironically, Putin used a term heavily associated
with the Responsibility to Protect and UN-sanctioned interventions to justify a blatant,
unilateral violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Russia subsequently stated its support for Crimea should a referendum show
desire to leave Ukraine and join Russia, and official results of the referendum vote on
March 16th said that 97% of voters support joining Russia. 469 Putin officially absorbed
Crimea into Russia two days later, though the vast majority of the international
community has refused to recognize Russian control of Crimea. 470
The situation in Ukraine provides a concrete example of Russia’s true
understanding of modern sovereignty. Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and Putin’s
claims of humanitarian justifications for its movement into Crimea in the first place
demonstrate a significant departure from the constant refrains of respect for state
sovereignty heard from Russia in the Security Council. Russia’s consistent opposition to
multilateral intervention in Syria coupled with its own unilateral interference in Ukraine
paint a picture of Russia as manipulating the concept of sovereignty. In the case of the
Syrian Civil War, Russia has taken advantage of the “mission creep” of the Libyan
intervention to defend Syrian sovereignty from external intervention, while in Ukraine,
and in Georgia in 2008, Moscow has barely attempted to convincingly justify its
unilateral violations of state sovereignty.
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